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ABSTRACT 
Network steganography encompasses the information hiding techniques that can be 
applied in communication network environments and that utilize hidden data carriers 
for this purpose. When describing a network steganography method despite the 
features like steganographic bandwidth, undetectability and robustness also 
steganographic cost should be considered. It is used as an indicator for the 
degradation or distortion of the carrier caused by the application of the 
steganographic method. In this master thesis we are going to evaluate how 
steganographic cost is affected in two different scenarios when using different 
steganographic methods, either separated or combined. We want to check the 
existence of two phenomena that can take place when combining two or more 
steganographic methods: superposition steganography and zero cost steganography. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  
Stolen data, information leaks, spying on the net: These and other similar terms and 
topics are subject to more and more debate. It is becoming apparent that studying and 
understanding all these topics has a huge importance, since they are being used more 
and more often. In fact, year 2011 was named by the media “the year of the hack” [1, 
2], since there were a lot of data security breaches in different private companies and 
governments. The amount of stolen data was estimated in petabytes [3].  
Most of these security breaches can be attributed to Operation Shady RAT [4, 2]. 
Numerous institutions around the world were targeted: in order to get the computers 
(or other electronic devices) infected, what they did was to deceive a lot of unaware 
users to open a specially crafted email (phishing), which was implanting a back door on 
their computers. Following this, the criminals were connecting to a website and 
downloading different files, which seemed to be legitimate (mainly HTML and JPEG 
files). But the truth is that the cybercriminals were encoding commands into these 
pictures and crafted web pages, hiding and making them invisible to unaware third-
parties, smuggling them through firewalls into the different systems under attack. 
Then, these control commands were ordering victim’s computer to obtain executable 
code from remote servers, allowing an outsider the access to local files on the 
compromised host [5]. These side channels in many cases remained open for months.  
We are also witnessing in these last years the birth of a new kind of malware. In June 
2010, Stuxnet [6], a computer worm was discovered. It was designed to affect Iranian 
nuclear power plants [7]. The next year, a new worm called Duqu was also found. It 
was pretty similar to Stuxnet, but unlike it, Duqu was used for extracting and stealing 
data, sending the captured information hidden into seemingly innocent pictures, which 
were traveling the network without raising any suspicion [8, 9, 2]. 
Nowadays, not only pictures are used as carriers. Music, videos, a packet traveling the 
net… All of these elements can be used as carriers for secret data.  
This process of embedding secret information into an innocent looking carrier is not a 
recent invention – it has been known and used for ages by humankind. This is what we 
call steganography. The inverse of steganography is called steganalysis, which 
concentrates on the detection of covert communication.  
The growing importance of steganography and steganalysis is what mainly motivated 
this Master thesis, in which we are going to implement different scenarios and make 
different trials in order to obtain some experimental results that will be helping us to 
prove the existence of two phenomena that can take place when combining two or 
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more different steganographic methods: superposition steganography and zero cost 
steganography.  
The results obtained in this thesis are important, since after confirming the existence 
of these two phenomena steganalyzers can take them into account, study them and 
start thinking about how to detect or counter them, or even use them (Since 
steganography has also some legal uses, like circumvention of web censorship and 
surveillance [10] or computer forensics). In fact, based on the experimental results 
provided in this thesis, a scientific paper for Security and Communication Networks 
Journal has been published [11]. 
 The thesis is structured as it follows: since not everyone will be familiar with 
steganography and its related terms and characteristics, we will start by giving some 
background information about steganography history and basics. With this 
background, we should be able to understand the two pehenomena whose existence 
we want to prove: superposition steganography and zero cost steganography. After 
that, we will proceed to explain the considered steganographic scenarios for IP 
networks. Later, we will explain the experimental test-bed setup, and then we will 
continue explaining the steganographic scenarios and methods implementation. We 
will finish the thesis by commenting the obtained results and giving some final 
conclusions related with them. Two annexes including the programming code and the 
references and bibliography will also be included.   
Let us start then by expanding on this steganography concept, explaining some cases 
of its usage, its characteristics and history. 
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2. Steganography history & basics  
2.1 Characteristics of Steganography and its Relationship to 
Cryptography 
Steganography is defined as the art of embedding secret messages (called 
steganograms) in a certain carrier, in order to communicate them in a covert manner 
[2]. With the use of steganography, we manage to hide the fact that we are sending a 
message. In other words, if not detected, both the sender and receiver are made 
“invisible”. 
 Steganography is often mistaken with information hiding, because it isn’t possible to 
establish a proper border between the two fields. There also exists a lack of a coherent 
classification for the newly invented clandestine methods for communication. It’s not 
strange for example for a method to be classified as steganographic and for another 
method similar to the first one to be classified as an information hiding technique.  
We can distinguish between what belongs to the spectrum of steganographic methods 
and what doesn’t belong there just by looking at certain conditions that the method or 
technique must fulfill in order for it to be considered steganographic [2]:  
• The secret information must be embedded in a seemingly innocent carrier, 
which camouflages it.  
• The purpose of applying a steganographic technique is to hide the information 
exchange from a third unaware party. 
• The secrecy of the communication is guaranteed primarily by the way the 
algorithm applied to the carrier camouflages the secret information, which 
should be good enough to withstand detection attempts.  
As for the carrier for the secret messages, we should try to find a carrier that fulfills the 
next two requirements: 
•  It should be popular. 
•  The steganogram insertion-related modifications of the carrier must be 
invisible to an unaware third party. Some degradation of the carrier caused by 
the steganographic modifications is allowed, but the severity of this 
degradation should be limited to a level low enough not to raise suspicion.  
We must also note that steganography is confused a lot of times with cryptography, 
since they both provide confidentiality to the communication. However, they are not 
the same thing: steganography describes the techniques to create a hidden 
communication channel, whereas cryptography is a designation of ongoing overt 
message exchange, where all the information is unintelligible to unauthorized parties. 
 The table on Figure 1 [2
steganography.  
Figure 1: Comparison of characteristics of steganography and cryptography
2.2 Recent Cases of Steganography Usage
• Steganographic methods
the attack on USA on 11th of September, 2001 [12, 13
images to hide all the 
posted on publicly available websites
the secret information they were carrying) without anyone noticing it
communication could have passed unnotice
 
• In [15], the case of “Operation Twins” is recollected, an
2002 with the capture of 
pedophile organization 
were doing this with the ai
  
• Steganographic methods hav
someone at the U.S. Department of Justice smuggled sensitive financial data 
out of the agency by embedding the data in several image files
  
• In 2010, a Russian spy ring 
used digital image steganography to leak classified info
Moscow [17], and they did this for years until they were finally discovered.
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 that ended in 
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• In March 2014, a new ZBOT malware appeared [18]. This malware was 
downloading into different computers what seemed to be an innocent picture 
of a sunset, but this picture had some steganographically hidden configuration 
files which main objective was to get bank account information from the 
victims. 
 
2.3 The origins and evolution of steganography 
Steganography is originally insipired in some of the skills displayed by either animals or 
plants for their survival that ancient people noticed: mimicry, to be more precise. 
Trying to imitate nature, the Ancient Greeks started to use steganography using 
ordinary objects to carry their secret messages.  
The first written evidence of the usage of a steganographic technique is attributed to 
Herodotus, a Greek historian. According to him, the secret message was hidden and 
carried by a hare corpse acting as some kind of game trophy [19]. Other famous Greek 
techniques include the use of coated wooden tables, carrying carved messages only 
readable after eliminating the wax coating. 
 The Greek methods were pretty easy to implement and as the human civilization 
progressed, new methods started to arise. With the popularization of parchment, 
sympathetic inks appeared: some saps were used for writing texts that were 
apparently invisible, but revealed after applying heat to the parchment [20]. 
 Romans brought more progress to steganography: they realized that the secret 
message didn’t have to necessarily take written form. Consequently, new methods 
were invented, like the Astragali [21], a small dice made of bone which holes could be 
used to send a secret message.  
More progress was made in the Medieval Ages. With the invention of papper, it 
started to become apparent that they had to think about some way to differentiate 
between different manufactures products. In order to solve this problem, 
watermarking was invented [22]. We should note that, nowadays, digital image 
steganography base on the same principle. 
Another of the inventions that became popular during these times is the acrostic, a 
textual steganographic method. Acrostic refers to pieces of writing, whose first letters 
or syllables spell out a message [2]. The most famous example of such textual 
steganography is attributed to a Dominican priest who, in 1499 hid in one of his books 
a love confession which could be spelled out from the first letter of each of the 
chapters of the book [23].  
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In the XVI century (The Renaissance), an Italian scientist discovered how to hide a 
message inside a hard-boiled egg: We just need to write it on the shell using ink made 
from a mixture of alum and vinegar. This solution penetrates the eggshell, being only 
readable once the shell is removed.  
In 1680 a new method was published. It consisted in hiding secret information using 
the different musical notes as carrier for sending the secret message: each note and 
their different combinations of the notes forming different chords corresponded to a 
letter [2]. This method had the problem of someone trying to play the obtained 
melodies, since they would sound pretty odd. 
New steganographic were developed also during the Industrial Revolution. 
Newspapers became pretty popular, and they started using them as the new 
steganographic carrier, by making holes over selected letters, writing that way the 
secret message. 
In the period of the two World Wars, and also in the period of the Cold War, many new 
techniques were developed, like the microdots: Punctuation marks with inserted 
microscopic negatives of images or texts [24, 2]. New spread spectrum steganographic 
techniques were also developed in the Second World War for guiding torpedoes [25]. 
These spread spectrum techniques were later used in the fields of digital media 
steganography. Some old techniques, like the invisible inks, made a comeback in this 
period also [26].  
Thanks to the technological development, new techniques were developed in the 20
th
 
century. Among these inventions we could find the “subliminal channels”, which based 
on cryptographic ciphers for the embedding of steganograms [2]. Their main principle 
was to insert content into digital signatures [27]. 
 
2.4 Modern steganographic techniques 
New modern steganographic techniques utilize the 20
th
 century’s inventions: Mainly, 
computers and networking. Four main trends of development can be distinguished [2]:  
• digital media steganography  
• linguistic steganography 
• file system steganography  
• network steganography 
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Digital media steganography dates back to the 1970’s. In these years, researchers 
focused on developing methods to secretly introduce some kind of invisible mark or 
signature into a digital picture. A lot of different methods were proposed [28]. We can 
classify the different algorithms they implemented for the embedding in digital 
pictures depending on the alterations introduced by them, being these alterations 
made on a bit level, or affecting the frequency domain characteristics, or exploiting 
specific file format intricacies [2]. It is also possible to use a mix of all the mentioned 
techniques. The transform domain provides for the most versatile medium of 
embedding. Affecting of the image processing algorithms may involve, among others, 
discrete cosine transform (DCT), discrete wavelet transform (DWT) or Fourier 
transform [29, 30].  
When using digital image steganography, we are trying to trick our eyes so they 
perceive an altered image as an unaltered one [28]. The same principle can be applied 
to the whole field of digital media steganography: what we are doing when using it is 
to try to trick human senses. 
Soon after starting to work with digital image steganography, experts noticed that it 
was also possible to trick the auditory system. So they stared to work with audio files 
and developing new techniques, like frequency masking, echo hiding, phase coding, 
patchwork or spread spectrum. They also noticed that error correction coding was a 
good supplemental carrier for audio steganography [28].  
Next, steganographers took video files as target carrier. Most of the designed methods 
were just adaptations of the algorithms used for audio and image files, but some 
video-specific solutions were also designed, involving for example I-frames color space 
[31] as steganographic carrier or P-frames and B-frames motion vectors.  
Alongside digital media steganography, information hiding in text was further 
developed, with methods that exploited various aspects of the written word, like 
word-spacing, a technique that was used at the times of Margaret Thatcher [32]. More 
advanced steganographic methods used syntactic and semantic structure of the text as 
a carrier: Displacement of punctuation marks, word order changes, etc. It has reached 
such a complexity that even apparently harmless SPAM messages may be a carrier of 
steganography nowadays [33]. It was also revealed that x86 machine code could also 
be used for carrying secret messages by using methods that exploited the same 
principle as linguistic steganography [34]. 
The invention of a steganographic file system was a true discovery [35]. It became 
apparent that information could be hidden even in isolated computing environments. 
The main principle of steganogram preparation is similar to invisible inks: if you know 
how to search for it, you will be able to reveal the encrypted files from a disk.  
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Alongside all the mentioned types of digital steganography, currently the target of 
increased interest is the fourth mentioned trend of development: Network 
steganography. We will now concentrate on this network steganography, since for this 
work we will be using some network steganography’s techniques. 
2.5 Network Steganography 
Just like with the other methods, the main aim of network steganography is to hide 
secret data in legitimate transmissions of users without destroying the hidden data 
carrier used. The scope of the network steganography is limited to all information 
hiding techniques that: (a) can be applied in communication networks to enable 
hidden data exchange by crating convert communication channel; (b) are inseparably 
bounded to the transmission process; (c) do not destroy the hidden data carrier. 
It must be emphasized that the main difference between “classic” steganography and 
the one utilized in networks is that the first relied on fooling human senses (as we have 
seen with the digital media steganography, for example), while the latter tries to 
deceive network devices (intermediate network nodes or end-user ones). 
In network steganography a carrier is at least one network traffic flow. Typically, 
carrier can be multi-dimensional, i.e. it offers many opportunities for information 
hiding (called subcarriers). And a subcarrier is defined as a “place” or a timing of 
“event” (e.g. a header field, padding or intended sequences of packets) in a carrier 
where secret information can be hidden using single steganographic technique (Figure 
2) 
 Figure 2: An Example of a carrier 
The most favourable carriers for secret messages in communication networks must 
have two features: 
• Carriers should be popular i.e. usage of such carriers 
as an anomaly itself. The more popular carriers are present and utilized in a 
network the better, because they mask existence of hidden communication.
• Carrier modification related to embedding of steganogram should not be 
“visible” to the third party not aware of the steganographic procedure. 
Contrary to typical steganographic methods which utilize digital media 
(pictures, audio and video files) as a cover for hidden data, network 
steganography utilizes network connections i.e. comm
control elements and their basic intrinsic functionality.
Every network steganographic method can be described typically by the following set 
of characteristics:  its steganographic bandwidth (a
media steganography), its undetectability (also referred as se
Fridrich[30]), and its robustness. The term “steganographic bandwidth” refers to the 
amount of secret data that can be sent per unit time when using a particular method. 
Undetectability is defined as the inability to detect a steganogram within a certain 
carrier. The most popular way to detect a steganogram is to analyze the statistical 
properties of the captured data and compare them with the typical values for that 
carrier. The last characteristic is robustness that is defined as the amount of alteration 
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and subcarriers based on VoIP connection example.
should not be considered 
unication protocols’ 
 
lso referred as capacity typically for 
curity in literature 
 
 
 
 steganogram can withstand without secret data being destroyed. A good 
steganographic method should be as robust and hard to detect as possible while 
offering the highest bandw
fundamental trade-off among these three measures necessary (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Relationship between characteristics of network steganography.
2.6 Steganographic cost
There is another characteristic 
network steganography methods: t
be taken into account to indicate the degradation or distortion of the carrier caused by 
the application of the steganographic
steganography, i.e. for hiding secret data in digital image, audio, video MSE (Mean
Square Error) or PSNR (Peak Signal
However, these parameters cannot be applied to dynam
network connections. For example, in the case of VoIP steganography methods, this 
cost can be expressed, for example, by providing a measure of the conversation quality 
degradation induced by applying a particular information hidi
fields of the protocol header are used as the hidden data carrier, then the cost is 
expressed as a potential loss in that protocol’s functionality. It is also possible that an 
information hiding method introduces steganographic cos
two different “planes”, e.g. it introduces voice quality degradation as well as it adds 
additional delays to the overt traffic.
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idth. However it must be noted that there is always a 
 
that we must take into account when evaluating 
he steganographic cost. This characteristic should 
 method (Figure 4). In digital media 
-to-Noise Ratio) were utilized for this purpose. 
ic, diverse carriers like 
ng technique. If certain 
t that can be experienced in 
 
 
 
 
-
 Figure 4: Relationship between steganographic cost and undetectability.
Therefore in general we can conclude that steganographic cost affects undetectability 
and may be responsible for loss of carrier’s functionality or loss of carrier’s 
performance (e.g. it results in longer connection or increased resources usage). The 
relationship between steganogr
One can imagine a steganographic cost as a “zip” as it provides a view on how exactly 
the carrier was affected by applying steganographic method. On the other hand 
undetectability can be imagined as a 
steganographic cost is exceeded (SC
detectable up to the point where the detection is trivial (SC
The effects of steganographic cost are threefold and form a vector for
steganographic method. Some steganographic methods affect the detectability, while 
others affect the feature spectrum or the performance of the carrier. Others affect 
multiple aspects simultaneously but in different extent. Besides splitting performa
and feature cost, both could be combined to functionality cost in order to achieve a 
twofold view of steganographic cost.
Steganographic cost can also be important when more than one method is applied to 
the same hidden data carrier. In this case, steg
relationships between steganographic methods applied to the same hidden data 
carrier, and some of these relationships might be really interesting. For example, 
despite general considerations, we think that is possible t
applied simultaneously to the same carrier affect each other in such a way that the 
resulting total cost is lower than the overall cost of these two methods when applied 
alone. We will be calling this situation superposition stegano
think that there can also be a special case of superposition steganography (that we will 
be calling zero cost steganography) which occurs if at least one steganographic method 
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aphic cost and undetectability is explained in Fig. 3. 
“switch” i.e. when the certain level of 
D) then the steganographic method becomes 
D100%). 
 
anographic cost allows observing the 
hat two or more methods 
graphy. Moreover, we 
 
 
 each 
nce 
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is applied to another steganographic method in a way that it results in no additional 
cost. 
In this work, what we are going to do is to design two different steganographic 
scenarios we thought about that will help us to prove if these superposition 
steganography and zero cost steganography cases are feasible or not. Let us proceed 
to explain this in more detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3. CONSIDERED STEGANOGR
In this thesis we intend to implement two different scenarios that will be helping us to 
prove the existence of the two terms we me
steganography and zero cost steganography.
3.1 Scenario 1: IP Fragmentation
Let us consider a case where two simple steganographic met
in [36] are applied to an IP-
F1 method relies on the parity of the number of fragments that the packet was divided 
into. SS (Steganogram Sender) is the source of the fragmentation and controls this 
process. SS inserts single bit of hidden data by dividing each of IP packets into the 
predefined number of fragments. For example, if the number of fragments is even 
then it means that binary 0 is transmitted and in other case binary 1 (Figure 5). The 
hidden data extraction is obvious as after the fragments reception SR utilizes the 
number of the fragments o
was sent. 
Of course if the statistical steganalysis based on number of fragments is performed to 
detect irregularities in number of each packet’s fragments the F1 method is not hard 
to detect.   
 
Figure 5: F1 Steganographic method example.
The second method (F3) utilizes legitimate fragments with steganogram inserted into 
payload for higher steganographic bandwidth and harder detection. SS is the source of 
the fragmentation and controls the process
data instead of inserting user data into the payload of selected fragments.
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ntioned before: superposition 
 
 
hods F1 and F3 as defined 
based traffic flow. 
f each received IP packet to determine what hidden data 
 
 
. During the fragmentation SS inserts secret 
 
 
 To make the steganographic fragments distinguishable from others yet hard to detect 
the following procedure was introduced. If SS and 
for each fragment chosen for steganographic communication the following hash 
function (H) is used to calculate Identifying Sequence (IS):
  
Where Fragment Offset and Identification denote values from these IP fragment 
header fields and ||bits concatenation function. For every fragment used for hidden 
communication the resulting IS will have different value due to the values change in a 
Fragment Offset field. All IS bits or only selected ones are distributed across the 
payload field in predefined manner. Thus, for each fragment SR can calculate 
appropriate IS and verifies if it contains secret or user data. If the verification is 
successful then the rest of the payload is considered as hidden data and extracted. 
Then SR does not utilize this fragment in reassembly process of original IP packet.
Figure 6 illustrates an example of the proposed steganographic method. IP packet with 
ID 345 is divided into four fragments (FR1
steganographic purposes, so inside its payload secret data is inserted together with 
correct IS. Values in Fragment Offset and identification fields remain the same as in 
other legitimate fragments. Wh
P1, P2 and P3, omits fragment F2 and use it only to extract secret data.
Figure 6: F3 Steganographic method example (H
Now let us consider the case when combined F1 a
simultaneously to the same hidden data carrier 
F1 modulates a number of fragments that the packet is divided into and F3 inserts fake 
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SR share a secret Steg
 
	||		
		||	 
-FR4). Fragment FR2 is used for 
ile reassembling original packet, SR merges payloads 
-header, P-payload, S
nd F3 methods are applied 
– IP-based traffic flow (Figure 7). 
-Key (SK) then 
 
 
 
-secret data). 
Since 
 fragments then if used combined the total steganograph
undetectability. This is what we call superposition steganography.
Figure 7: Simultaneous utilization of F1 and F3 methods.
So, for this first scenario, we will have
be connected between them, with PC
A as the steganogram receiver (SR).
what kind of traffic later) directed
be sending some hidden information
studying how steganographic cost is affected in four different cases:
• Case 1: No steganography case, where we will be applying no steganographic 
method over the information transf
other words, we will not be sending secret information in this case).
• Case 2: F1 method case, where we will use F1 steganographic method over the 
IP traffic in order to send some secret information from PC
• Case 3: F3 method case, where we will use F3 steganographic method over the 
IP traffic in order to send some secret information from PC
• Case 4: F1+F3 methods case, where we will use simultaneously both F1 and F3 
steganographic methods over
information from PC
We will compare the obtained results for each of the cases
existence of the superposition steganography phenomena. 
3.2 Scenario 2: HTTP Headers
We will now consider a case where three simple steganographic methods F6, F7 and F8 
are applied to an HTTP-based traffic flow.
In order to steganographically send the secret information, method F6 changes the 
case of the different HTTP header fields, F7 changes the ord
F8 changes the total number of header fields. Only method F8 introduces 
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 two virtual machines, PC-A and PC
-B acting as the steganogram sender (SS), and PC
PC-B will be sending IP traffic (we will be specifying 
 to PC-A, and alongside this normal IP traffic
 making use of IP fragmentation. Then, we will be 
 
erence that happens between both PCs (in 
-B to 
-B to PC
 the IP traffic in order to send some secret 
-B to PC-A. 
 in order to prove the 
 
 
 
er of the header fields, and 
 
 
-B. They will 
-
 we will 
 
PC-A. 
-A. 
 steganographic cost by increasing the header’s size and thus the available space for 
the remaining payload. Methods F6 and F7 modify the already created he
elements of F8 without degrading the functionality of the protocol or the performance 
of the request. Thus, methods F6 and F7 add no additional steganographic cost, or are, 
in other words zero cost methods in combination with F8. We i
Figure 8:
 
Figure 8: Three steganographic methods applied to the HTTP Request header.
In this second scenario, we
connected between them. This time, PC
(SS) and PC-B as the steganogram receiver. PC
PC-A as a client machine that will constantly send HTTP Requests to the server. Of 
course, steganographically hidden information will be sent on th
headers. Here, we will be analyzing
different cases: 
• Case 1: No steganography case, where we will be applying no steganographic 
method over the information transference that happens between bot
other words, we will not be sending secret information in this case).
• Case 2: F6 method case, where we will use F6 steganographic method over the 
HTTP traffic in order to send some secret information from PC
• Case 3: F7 method case, whe
HTTP traffic in order to send some secret information from PC
• Case 4: F8 method case, where we will use F8 steganographic method over the 
HTTP traffic in order to send some secret information from
• Case 5: F6+F7+F8 methods case, where we will use simultaneously F6, F7 and 
F8 steganographic methods over the HTTP traffic in order to send some secret 
information from PC
We will compare the obtained results for these five cases 
existence of the zero cost steganography phenomena.
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3.3 Procedure 
The total work for the realization of this thesis can be divided into four clear different 
parts: 
• 1) Preparation of the scenarios: installation and preparation of the virtual 
machines. 
The first thing that we must do is to correctly install the virtual machines we 
are going to use for the implementation of the thesis’s scenarios, as well as all 
of the programs and instruments we are going to need in each virtual machine. 
We will be using virtual machines working under Ubuntu’s Linux operating 
system. We will also be needing to install some applications like Wireshark 
(required for traffic analysis), g++ (because we are going to be working with 
C++ and we will be needing the compilator), and at least in one of the virtual 
machines we will have to install and correctly configure one HTTP server, so we 
can have HTTP traffic between the virtual machines. With the correct 
configuration of the virtual network that connects our machines, we will have 
ended the first part of the master thesis. 
 
• 2) Programming of each of the 9 cases. 
Once we have our scenarios correctly implemented, the next thing we will have 
to do is to prepare each of the nine study cases (previously mentioned in 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2). In other words, we will have to implement the different 
steganographic methods. Since we will have to manipulate some of the 
packet’s information (like the headers in HTTP, or the number of fragments 
when working with IP fragmentation) before sending them from one computer 
to the other in order to send the hidden information, we will need to use IP-
Tables, a tool which will allow us to change the packets’ information before 
sending them. Combining IP-Tables with C++ programming, we will implement 
all of the study cases. 
• 3) Simulation, analysis and evaluation of the results. 
Once we have each case programmed, we will have to try them (around 10-20 
times each, so we can calculate mean values and standard deviations) and then 
to analyze the obtained results with the help of Wireshark, looking how 
steganographic cost is affected on each case. We will then proceed to compare 
the results in order to prove our hypothesis about super-position 
steganography and zero-cost steganography. 
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• 4) Conclusions. 
After analyzing all the results and comparing the cases between them, we will 
conclude the work giving our final conclusions. 
We will now proceed to describing total work in detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4. EXPERIMENTAL TEST
4.1 Installation of the machines
The first thing we have to do is to install the two virtual machi
with. We decided to use free software VirtualBox, a program that allows the user to 
easily create virtual machines, giving them t
memory dedicated to the virtual machine, the operative system running in the 
machine or the different connections and interfaces that the machine has.
After installing the program, we proceed to create
case, we named them PC-
Ubuntu (Linux) in both virtual machines. 
to work with programs like Wireshark, or to download programming libraries
using Linux than when using Windows for exa
Linux operative system that
Figure 9: Virtual machine PCB using Ubuntu operating system, version 12.04.
After installing Ubuntu, we will 
going to need, like Wireshark or g++ compiler. This is easily done by using 
command. 
We must note one important thing here: n
work. At first we tried to use version 10.10, but this version
Cannonical Ltd. Enterprise, which means that we were
that had no longer technical support nor updates. 
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-BED SETUP 
 
nes we are going to work 
he choice to control things such as
 the two virtual machi
A and PC-B. As for the operative system, we
The main reason for it is that we
mple. We chose Ubuntu because it i
 we are more familiar with. 
also have to install the programs and libraries we are 
ot every Ubuntu version is 
 is no longer supporte
 trying to work with a version 
Because of this,
 the 
 
nes. In our 
 chose to use 
 find it easier 
 when 
s the 
 
 
apt-get 
valid for this 
d by 
 for example, 
 something as simple as to use 
working, since it was no longer possible
and programs from Ubuntu’s servers. 
order to avoid this kind of problems, l
In the future, if someone wants to repeat this work he will have to take into 
that the version we ended up using (12.04, supported until 2017) might not be suitable 
for the work by then. 
4.2 Installation of the virtual network
After preparing the virtual machines, the next thing 
virtual network connecting them. Each of the virtual machines has two interfaces: 
of these interfaces will be 
IP address via DHCP protocol. The other interface will be connected to an intern 
network common to both machines, providing
between them. This interfaces
addresses, masks and gateways.
 This entire network configuration is 
program, we have to select one of the virtual machines and then, without initiating the 
machine, we access to the configuration menu. Inside this menu, going to the network 
section, we are able to habilitate as many interfaces as
two of them, one connected to the internet (NAT) and another one connected to an 
intern network. We must do this again with the other virtual machine. 
Figure 10: Activation of the interfaces in VirtualBox.
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command “apt-get” to install new programs
 to correctly access and to download some files 
We have to work with a supported version in 
ike the one we ended up choosing: version 12.04.
 
we have to do is to
directly connected to the internet, and will be obtaining
 a direct communicati
 connected to the intern network will be having
 
pretty easy to do: after initiating VirtualBox 
 we want: We have to habilitate 
 
 
 wasn’t 
 
account 
 make the 
One 
 its 
on channel 
 fixed IP 
 
 After activating both interfaces on each machine
correctly change the interface
interfaces connected to the intern network. The ones connected to the internet will be 
using DHCP protocol to obtain their IP address. This 
figures (Figure 11 and Figure 12).
Figure 11:
Figure 12:
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, we must initiate the machines and 
s’ configuration: we will be fixating IP address
is illustrated in the next two 
 
 Network interface’s configuration (I). 
 Network interface’s configuration (II). 
es for the 
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5. STEGANOGRAPHIC SCENARIOS AND METHODS 
IMPLEMENTATION 
We will now proceed to describe how each of the steganographic methods used in this 
Master thesis was implemented. In this section, we will be fairly descriptive: we will 
focus on describing how the methods were implemented and how the problems 
encountered were tackled, without making any reference to the implemented 
programming code. Related programming code can be found in Annex 1. 
5.1 IP TABLES 
In order to capture and manipulate the packets, we are going to use netfilter/IP tables.  
IP tables is a user space application program that allows a system administrator to 
configure the tables provided by the Linux kernel firewall (implemented as different 
Netfilter modules) and the chains and rules it stores. Different kernel modules and 
programs are currently used for different protocols; iptables applies to IPv4, ip6tables 
to IPv6, arptables to ARP, and ebtables to Ethernet frames. 
iptables requires elevated privileges to operate and must be executed by user root, 
otherwise it fails to function. On most Linux systems, iptables is installed as 
/usr/sbin/iptables and documented in its man pages which can be opened using man 
iptables when installed. It may also be found in /sbin/iptables, but since iptables is 
more like a service rather than an "essential binary", the preferred location remains 
/usr/sbin. 
All packets passing through a host are traversing what we call iptables chains (see 
figure below). There are three main types of these chains:   
• INPUT – chain for incoming (received) packets that are intended for a process 
running on the local machine 
• OUTPUT – chain for packets that are being sent from a process running on the local 
machine 
• FORWARD – chain for packets that are being forwarded through the host (from one 
network interface to another) 
 All our programs have a common part, which consists in a GTK graphic interface that 
allows us to control the different chains with which IP Tables work.
the iptables chains, packets are in the kerne
space. Because of that, to perform modifications, packets from selected chains are put 
to a special QUEUE chain. This chain does not appear in the normal/usual packet 
traversing paths. Subsequently, the libnetfi
library mentioned in the previous section)
user space, where packet modifications take place. Following the modifications, 
packets are returned to the QUEUE and continue trave
illustrate all this in the next figure.
Figure 14: IP Tables working scheme.
Lets explain now how must we modify the packets for each steganographic case.
5.2 IP FRAGMENTATION
We will start by explaining all the methods related with 
Before explaining each one of them
are going to work with. 
27 
Figure 13: IP Tables Chains. 
 While traversing 
l space, which is inaccessible from the user 
lter_queue module (the netfilter queue 
 is used to send packets one by one to the 
rsing the iptables chains.
 
 
-RELATED METHODS 
the IP- fragmentation
, we will be clarifying the kind of IP traffic that we 
 
 We 
 
 
 scenario. 
 We decided to use ICMP echo requests
experiment. 
This might seem to be a strange decision, since
sending user information. The use of other kind of traffic, like for example FTP traffic, 
seems like a better option. And t
connection to send a file over which we would be introducing the hidden information 
steganographically. The main reason for using ICMP echo requests
an FTP connection, as originally planned, is that
unknown reasons it wasn’t possible to analyze how
since Wireshark only presents the full FTP
fragmentation, as you can see in the figure bellow.
Figure 15: Wireshark capture of an FTP file transfer with interface MTU=500: Full 
packets are presented, and it’s impossible to analyze fragmentation.
This problem disappears when using ICMP traffic:
to see all of the packet’s fragments o
ICMP traffic for the experiments (s
fragments for their analysis)
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-replays carrying random data
 ICMP isn’t even normally us
his was actually our first idea: t
-replays instead of 
 when using an FTP connection, for 
 IP fragmentation
-Data packets sent before any kind of 
 
 when using ICMP traffic, it’s
n Wireshark, and because of it we
ince it’s vital for our thesis to be able to capture the
.  
 for this 
ed for 
o use an FTP 
 was affected, 
 
 
 possible 
 decided to use 
 
 Figure 16: ICMP Packets captured: It’s possible to analyze IP Frag
5.2.1 No Steganography 
As we already explained, we decided to work with ICMP Echo Request/Replies for this 
scenario, sending packets that carry a total
data generated by ourselves in this case).
This might seem to be a strange choice. We chose to send packets carrying 1432 bytes 
of data because of the network MTU and the way we want it to divide our packets:
we add to this data the 8
packet which total size equals 1460 bytes. B
decided to fixate (it is fixated to that number when starting the programs)
is divided into three fragments, and each one of the fragments carries their own 20
byte IP-Header. As a result, we end up having 3 fragments equally sized, w
equal to 500 bytes (not taking into account the Ethernet headers in any moment). We 
illustrate this in the figure below.
Figure 17: Fragmentation of a 1432 byte
So, for the No Steganography case
prepared that directly send ICMP ping requests with this packet size of 1432 bytes. We 
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mentation.
 amount of 1432 bytes of data (r
 
-byte ICMP header and the 20-byte IP header, we have a 
ecause of the MTU of 500 bytes we
 
-length packet.
 (described in Section 3.1), we have a script 
 
 
andom 
 if 
 
, this packet 
-
ith a size 
 
 
 capture the pings with IP tables before sending th
just change all the data 
generated by ourselves. This is done in order for the traffic to look closer to what real 
traffic would look like, since the data carried originally by the ICMP packets consists 
just in a cyclic numeric progression (0x00, 0x01, 0x02, …, 0xFF;  repeated as many 
times as needed), which is a pretty unrealistic representation of what real data would 
look like. We can see the difference in the next 2 pictures.
Figure 18: ICMP packet with data generated by
Figure 19: ICMP packet with the random data we generated.
We are using IP Tables to captur
of synchronization problems that we couldn’t solve: 
lost. In order to solve this problem, we prepared
starts by generating these 2 pings that are going to get l
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em into the network and then we 
they are originally carrying by the random data stream 
 
 the ICMP protocol
e and modify the packets, and this gives us some ki
the 2 first packets we s
 the script so it works as it follows: i
ost, then it waits 20 seconds 
 
 
 
 
nd 
end are 
t 
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(so the user can start the wireshark capture, for example), and then it starts launching 
the pings. 
 This script solves the problem because the programs we are using for modifying the 
packets have an int-type variable called “trigger”, which is used for those 2 initial pings 
needed for synchronization:  this variable works as a trigger that makes sure that no 
information is sent until the third ping is sent, moment in which the trigger value is 
reached. So, despite those 2 initial pings, no data (normal or hidden) is lost.  
Of course, after changing all the data, our program recalculates both IP and ICMP 
checksum before sending the packet back into the network. These checksums are 
calculated by forming the ones’ complement of the ones’ complement sum of the 
header's 16-bit words, and this is directly what our program does after fixating the 
initial checksum values to 0. Check annex 1 if you want to look at the exact 
programming code implemented for it. 
We must note that these operations have a cost: we have to introduce the data and 
recalculate the checksums, which takes some time, and so we have an increment in 
the total connection time if we compare it with the case in which we don’t change the 
packet’s data. There is no problem with it, since we are doing exactly the same 
operation in all of the fragmentation cases, so the overtime for introducing the 
randomly generated data will be affecting equally all of them. 
5.2.2 F1 Method 
For the second case of this scenario, we will have to implement F1 steganographic 
method. This method relies on the parity of the number of fragments that the packet 
was divided into.  
For its implementation, we decided to send: 
- 4 fragments if we want to send a secret binary 0.  
- 3 fragments if we want to send a secret binary 1. 
 So, if we compare it with the no steganography case, we are sending an extra 
fragment (which is useful, since it carries normal information) every time we are 
sending a secret 0. 
 All of the sent fragments have the same size (500 bytes each, excluding Ethernet 
header), since we think is more realistic to find similar sized fragments when you study 
a real-life fragmentation scenario. Consequently, the full packets we are sending will 
be having different sizes, depending on if a secret 0 or 1 is being sent. 
 Of course, we won’t be changing
packet depending on the secr
packets, and our program is the one that will be changing their size.
If you check the script prepared for this 
in the CD annex to this paper)
case (trigger issue and all included). The only difference resides in the chosen ping size: 
1912 bytes, so we obtain 4 e
Figure 20: Fragmentation of a 1912 byte
We are always generating and sending packets that carry 1912 bytes of data, 
independently of the secret information we want to send. 
of dat instead of 1432 because u
make a smaller packet from a big one than the other way around, so a packet of 1912 
bytes (which is divided into 4 equally sized fragments) is generated
depending on if we need the packet to be divided into 4 or 3 fragments, it’s total 
length is altered or not, as we can see in the figure below:
Figure 21: Resizing of the packets, F1 method.
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 the packet size by ourselves each time we send a 
et information we are sending: we will send equally sized 
 
and the other steganographic cases
, you will see that it’s exactly the same as in the previous 
qually sized fragments after the packet’s fragmentation.
-length packet.
We are sending 1912 bytes 
sing my program and IP Tables, we found it easier to 
 
 
 (included 
 
 
 
 and then, 
 
 Of course, when we do this a new issue appears: n
packet’s total size, so we can have the number of fragments we desire, and so we can 
send the secret information without any problem. But we must also think about what 
happens with the not hidden information
Unfortunately, if we cut the packet
that. So we had to come up with another way to solve this problem. Since we do all 
this in the PC that is going to send both the normal file and the sec
have access to both files, what we decided to do is to reintroduce the normal, not 
hidden information again into the packet after it has already been prepared to be 
divided into 3 or 4 fragments. 
We will try to illustrate it with an ex
00100 using F1 method. Let’s suppose we are using a file that, when sent, need to be 
divided into 20 fragments. If we just send 1912 length packets with information and 
we cut the total length of the packet 
fragments, we would be seeing that, while the secret information would be correctly 
received, we would be losing one of the fragments transporting not
information, as we illustrate in the next figure:
Figure 22: Fragment lost because of F1 method proposed implementation.
This problem is avoided when the program has direct acce
let’s think of the same example as above: s
method. But now, let’s suppose that our program has access not only to the secret 
data, but also to the file of data we want to send. After obtaining a packet and altering 
its length, what we can do is re
formed packet using the space we have: i
bytes will be written; if we just have 1432, only 1432 will be written.
  After the end of the secret transmission, since we know we are using a 
steganographic method, we can make ou
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ow, we are able to change the 
, the one carried by the IP packet.
, part of its information is lost, and we can’t afford 
ret file, and so we 
 
ample: let’s imagine we want to send secret data 
when we receive a 1 so it is divided into 3 
 
ss to the file we are sending: 
ending the secret sequence 00100 using F1 
-write the original data we want to send into the newly 
f we have 1912 bytes available to fill, 1912 
 
r application produce some extra packets that 
 
-secret 
 
 
 will not be used to carry secret information, but to send the normal information that 
has yet to be sent.  
If for example, we know that we have sent a total of 400 secret 1’s, we will know that 
after the secret transmission is finished we have yet to send 400 more fragments of 
real information: 100 packets. Since we will be aware of this fact, we can adapt our file 
or our application to it. For example, we can modify the file we are going to send, 
filling the end of the file with useless data that will be replaced by the original one 
after the steganographic method is applied on it. We illustrate this in the next figure:
  
Figure 23: F1 method correct implementation.
So, to sum it up, what our program does is 
a secret 1 or 0 is being sent it ch
variable ret, which contains the captured packet’s length); and finally we introduce the 
random data we generated into th
the no steganography case. On the receiver size, since we obtain full packets of 
different lengths, we determine if a 0 or a 1 was sent by l
(again, stored in variable ret afte
One thing that we must notice is that we are working by altering and observing full 
packets, instead of fragments: 
single fragments with IP-tables and Net Filter: even when usin
it, we only managed to capture full packets. Luckily, it’s possible to implement all the 
steganographic methods we want to implement by working with the full packets 
instead of with the fragments.
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to capture the packet; then depending on if 
anges the total packet length (by changing the value of 
e newly obtained packet, the same way we did it in 
ooking at the packet’s length 
r capturing the packet). 
we are doing so because we couldn’t manage to capture 
g the tools they offer for 
 
 
 
 5.2.3 F3 Method 
Let’s go with F3 method now. This method
sections, utilizes legitimate fragments with steganogram inserted into payload for 
higher steganographic bandwidth and harder detection. SS is the source of the 
fragmentation and control the 
data instead of inserting user data into the payload of selected fragments.
To make the steganographic fragments distinguishable from others yet hard to detect 
the following procedure was introduced: i
for each fragment chosen for steganographic communication the following hash 
function (H) is used to calculate what we call the Identifying Sequence (IS):
  
Where Fragment offset and 
header fields, and || bits concatenation function. For every fragment used for hidden 
communication, the resulting IS will have different value due to the values change in 
the fragment offset and identification fields.
distributed across payload field in predefined manner. Thus, for each fragment SR can 
calculate appropriate IS and verifies if it contains secret or user data. If the verification 
is successful then the rest of the pa
Then, SR does not utilize this fragment in reassembly process of original IP packet.
So, when using this method, some 
with the no steganography case, we are s
fragments that carry the information and one extra fragment per packet that carries 
the hidden information. 
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, as we already described in previous 
process. During the fragmentation, SS inserts secret 
f SS and SR share a secret Steg
|	
	| 
Identification denote values from these IP fragment 
 All IS bits or only selected ones are 
yload is considered as hidden data and extracted. 
extra fragments are generated: if we compare it 
ending 4 fragments instead of 3: the same 3 
Figure 24: F3 method description. 
 
-Key (SK) then 
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For this method implementation, we are using 1912-length packets again. This time we 
won’t be modifying their length, so we will always be obtaining 4 fragments per 
packet.  
We decided to use the second fragment for sending the secret information. There is no 
special reason for this: we just didn’t want to make the programming code more 
complicated. The normal data is introduced into the first, third and fourth fragments, 
so even if we have 4 fragments, we are sending the same quantity of normal 
information per packet that we were sending on the No Steganography case. Of 
course, we do all this working with the full packet: since we know exactly how the 
packet is going to be fragmented and which bytes are going to be in every packet, 
there is no problem with doing it. 
As for the second fragment, we fully use it to send 476 hidden bits (the total 
fragment’s size minus the number of bytes occupied by the IS), so in this case we are 
sending 476 bits per packet. We implement the method exactly as we described 
before: first, we introduce into the first bytes of an array the Steg-Key (which is known 
for both SS and SR), followed by the fragment offset (Known because we know it’s the 
second fragment and the number of bytes carried by each fragment) and the packet ID 
(extracted from the packet’s IP Header). 
 Of course, all of this is affected by a hash function known by both sides of 
communication. We decided to use the function hash(), already included in the 
standard C++ libraries. With it, we obtain a 4 character string, which we put at the 
beginning of the fragment. After this 4 character string, we introduce the 476 secret 
bits we are sending. Finally, we recalculate both ICMP and IP header checksums, as in 
the previous case. 
In the receiving side, we just extract the correct fragments in order into a buffer (which 
will contain the normal data) that can later give it to the application. After checking if 
the second fragment has a correct identifying sequence, the 8 bits secretly sent are 
extracted. The rest of the second fragment is discarded, since it’s useless. 
5.2.4 F1+F3 Methods 
In first scenario’s final case, we will be using F1 and F3 methods combined. Because F1 
method modulates the number of fragments that the packet is divided into and F3 
inserts fake fragments, we can use them combined in a way that will make the total 
steganographic cost decrease and undetectability increase: we use F1 Method, with 
which we are obtaining 4 or 3 fragments per packet, and then we also use F3 method 
every time we have obtained 3 fragments using method F1, so we obtain an extra 
fragment that makes us always have 4 fragments per packet. The steganographic cost 
decrease we obtain when combining the two methods is what we call super-position 
steganography. You can see how the method works in the figure below. 
 Figure 25: F1+F3 methods description.
For the implementation of this method, we
programs we had already made for the F1 and F3 
byte-length pings, which will be divided into 4 fragments each. We
F1 method: if a 0 was sent, then we just fill the packet with the information we 
generated and send it back to the network. If a 1 was sent, we apply
this packet: we introduce the normal information into the first, third and fourth 
fragment and use the second one for introducing more hidden data. Of course, after all 
these alterations, we recalculate both ICMP and IP Header
In the receiving side, it’s easy to extract the secret: a
search for the Identifying seque
know that a 0 was sent using method F1 and we save all the information contained by 
the packet. If we find the IS, we know that a 1 was sent using method F1 and that 
method F3 was also used, so we wri
secret information, then we extract the hidden information sent using F3 method in 
the second fragment, and finally we save the information carried by the first, thi
fourth fragment.  
5.3 HTTP RELATED CASES
We will now proceed to describe the HTTP scenario’s cases. We
what are we sending in the
of the used steganographic 
5.3.1 No Steganography 
In this scenario, we are going to work with HTTP protoco
(which works as a web server) for webpage index.html. We will be repeating this HTTP 
Request a lot of times, and when using the steganographic methods, we w
altering the HTTP headers in order to send the secret information.
37 
 
 just combined in a proper way the 
cases separately: we generate 1912 
 start by using the 
 the F3 method to 
-Checksums.
fter receiving the packet, we 
nce (IS) we use with method F3: if we don’t find it, we 
te the secret one sent using F1 method into the 
 
 will start by explaining 
 no steganography case, and after that we will
methods and the way we implemented them.
l: PCA will be requesting PCB 
 
 
 
rd and 
 explain each 
 
ill be 
 Unlike the first scenario’s No steganography case, in which we had to alter the packet 
in order to introduce the random data generated by ourselves, in this case we don’t 
have to modify the HTTP request, so we 
second scenario. 
This script basically asks a lot of times for the index.html page, using the following 
order: 
Wget 10.0.1.2/index.html --
Since they end up being stored on the PC, we dele
after each request. 
It’s important to note that, in the script, we send a normal request and then we wait 
for 20 seconds before sending the rest of the request. This first request is sent 
because, just like on the previous fragmentation cases, when capturing the packets 
using IP Tables for their modification in the steganographic cases, there are some 
synchronization issues that are again solved using a trigger in our programs, so no 
information is sent on this first HTTP request. The 20 second wait time is so we can 
start the wireshark capture.
5.3.2 F6 Method 
The first steganographic method we
basically changes the case of one or more of the header fields, using capital or small 
letters depending on the information we want to send. We can use for example small 
letters for representing secret 0’s and c
total header length is not altered by the usage of this method.
For its implementation, we
the case of the word Agent. Since it has 5 letters, we are 
packet.  We can see an example on the next image:
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Figure 26: HTTP scenario. 
just have to run the script we prepared for th
no -cache 
te the obtained index.html page 
 
 will describe is the F6 method. This method 
apital letters for representing secret
 
 decided to only use the User-Agent header, modifying only 
able to send 5 secret bits per 
 
 
e 
 1’s. The 
 Figure 27: Wireshark capture, F6 method.
The case modification is pretty easy to do: a
program has a pointer to the Agent word in the 
on the secret information we want to send, it changes the case of the letters by adding 
or subtracting the fixed quantity that separates small and capital letters in ASCII code: 
32. After doing this, we recalculate both I
then we send the packet back to the network.
On the receiving side, we just check the ASCII code for the Agent word in the User
Agent header in order to know if a secret 1 or 0 was sent.
5.3.3 F7 Method 
We will now explain F7 method.  This method works by changing the order of the 
header fields, so depending on the secret information we are sending 
be following one order or the other. At least 2 headers are required for the 
implementation of this method. The total header length is not altered by the usage of 
this method. 
For its implementation, we
When we are sending a secret 0, they are in their predetermined order 
Accept header, then the Host one), and when we are sending a sec
changed (first the host header, then the Accept one).
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fter capturing the HTTP Request, our 
User-Agent header. Then, depending 
P and TCP header checksums, so they fit, and 
 
 
 decided to use the Host header and the Accept header. 
ret 1, their order is 
 
 
-
the headers will 
(first the 
 Figure 28: Wireshark capture, F7 method (I).
Figure 29: Wireshark capture, F7 method (II).
This method is pretty easy to implemen
and then only when we have to send a secret 1 we just change the header’s order 
using an auxiliary buffer. After this, we recalculate IP and TCP header
we send the packets back to the network.
One the receiving side, we just look which header is first by looking at the ASCII code of 
the first letter in the first header: j
or 1 was sent. 
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t too: first we capture the HTTP request packet, 
 
ust with that, we are able to determine if a secret 0 
 
 
-checksums and 
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5.3.4 F8 Method 
The next method we will be explaining is the F8 method. This method changed the 
total number of header fields in order to send the secret information:  depending on 
the total number of header fields sent per packet, we will know if a secret 0 or 1 was 
sent. The total header length is altered when using this method. 
In our case, what we decided to do is to send a total number of 4 header fields when 
sending a secret 0 (the ones normally generated when making our HTTP Request: 
User-Agent, Accept, Host and Connection) and a number of just 3 header fields when 
sending a secret 1 (eliminating in this case the Connection Header field). So, we either 
send the packet without altering it or we make it shorter eliminating one header field. 
Again, we decided to make the packet shorter instead of longer because we found it 
easier to do with netfilter and IP Tables than making it longer. 
In the receiving side, initially we just checked the total packet length in order to see if a 
secret 0 or 1 had been sent.  
 Unfortunately, when doing this, something really bad was happening: the HTTP 
connection was constantly resetting. After some research, we discovered that the 
problem was in the TCP connection and the ACK method that it uses. 
We will try to illustrate the problem: let’s imagine our application has created a 200 
byte-length packet and it sends it into the network.  This packet is captured by our 
program and modified, so it ends up having only a total amount of 180 bytes for 
example. It reaches the receiving side of the connection and, since it’s a correct packet, 
the receiving side just extracts it and sends back an ACK packet to the sending side. 
And here is where the problem resides: the sending side receives an ACK confirmation 
for 180 bytes, and since it sent a 200 byte-length packet, it assumes that the last bytes 
were lost and so it retransmits this last 20 bytes.  
This retransmission reaches the receiving side again, but since they only carry the last 
part of an HTTP request without header and anything the receiving side doesn’t know 
what to do with this data, and so the connection crashes. 
We tried to solve this problem modifying the ACK numbers, but it didn’t solve 
anything. The main problem is that, no matter how much we modify the packet, the 
application that originally generated it knows how it was, and so it notices if something 
is going wrong with the connection and so it ends up resetting it. 
After much thinking, we came out with a solution, the one we finally implemented: on 
the sending side, the program used is the same (we eliminate the connection header 
field when sending a 1), but on the receiving side, after looking at the packet’s length 
and determining if a secret 0 or 1 had been sent, we reconstruct the eliminated header 
 field in case a secret 1 was sent before sending the packet to the ap
this, the receiving side sends back to the sending side an ACK number that matches its 
expectations, and so the connection doesn’t reset and ends up in a proper way.
Of course, this solution is not 100% per
up resetting, we can see some strange packets in wireshark every time we send a 1. 
These aren’t incorrect packets, but packets that wireshark marks as strange, since even 
though everything works fine there is something that doesn’t fit with 
numbers. Wireshark makes the interpretation that the connection went fine, and that 
there was a packet which it didn’t capture but reached the destiny correctly following 
another possible network route or path. You can see these strange packets in 
figure below, obtained every time a 1 is being sent:
Figure 30: Wireshark capture, strange packets obtained when trying F8 method.
After many trials we weren’t able to eliminate the appearance of at least some of 
these strange packets, but at least 
without the connection resetting. And, since the appearance of this kind of packets 
would be not that strange in bigger networks with multiple paths, we think that it’s not 
that big of a problem. 
5.3.5 F6+F7+F8 methods 
For the final case, we just used F6, F7 and F8 methods all together, working as we 
described earlier. For its implementation, we just combined the already made 
programs for the individual cases.
So, in the sending side, we first apply F8 metho
to the captured packet. After receiving it, we extract the secret information the exact 
same way. 
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6. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
6.1 Simulation 
With all the programs done, the next step is to make all the simulations, in order to get 
the results so we can analyze them and see if we were right with the superposition 
steganography’s and the zero cost steganography’s hypothesis. 
6.1.1 Scenario 1 
For the first scenario (IP-fragmentation), as we already know, we have two virtual 
machines, PC-A and PC-B. They are connected to the internet and to a common intern 
network (network 10.0.1.0/24). PC-B is the steganogram sender (SS), and PC-A acts as 
the steganogram receiver (SR).  We prepared a pair of scripts that make PC-B send a 
total amount of 2400 ICMP echo request packets (altered by PC-B itself so they carry 
random data as we mentioned) directed to PC-A, via the intern network that connects 
them. The random data carried is always generated the same way and so it’s always 
the same stream of random information, no matter the steganographic method 
applied, so we are sending the same normal, not hidden information in every 
transmission.  
PC-B further alters the packets that are going to be sent depending on the 
steganographic method we are implementing. Then, PC-A (the SR) will be receiving 
them and, before sending back the echo reply, separating the normal and the secret 
information. Only the interfaces connected to the intern network will be needed: the 
internet interfaces aren’t used on this scenario. 
We will be capturing all the packets on the SR side (PC-A) with Wireshark. The time of 
the capture will always starts once the first fragment of the first data packet is 
captured, and we will be sending the same number of packets on each simulation. The 
network MTU is equal to 500 bytes, and that’s the size that all the fragments will be 
having on this scenario (the total length of the packets and, with it, the total number of 
fragments they are fragmented into will vary depending on the steganographic 
method utilized). We will be making 10 simulations per case, so a total of 40 
simulations for the first scenario.  
The secret information that we are sending is t the first chapter of book “El ingenioso 
Hidalgo Don Quixote de la Mancha” (we translated each character into their respective 
ASCII code, and that’s what we send).  
We illustrate the scenario on the next figure. 
 Figure 31: ICMP Scenario depiction.  
6.1.2 Scenario 2 
The second scenario is pretty similar to the 
machines (PC-A and PC-B), connected directly to the internet and to an intern network. 
This time, PC-B will be acting as a WEB Server, and PC
same HTTP Request for the webpage “in
the command: 
Wget 10.0.1.2/index.html --
This command allows us to request for a webpage without using Firefox or any other 
web browser, and it makes sure that 
(since we are going to ask for the webpage multiple times
cache to affect our results).
PC-A acts as the steganogram sender (SS) this time: i
HTTP request packets (depending on the 
the network. Once they arrive to the server on PC
the secret information is extracted. Then, PC
back to PC-A. Once again, the internet interfa
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first one: again, we have the same 2 virtual 
-A will be constantly making the 
dex.html”, a total number of 900 times,
 no - cache 
we don’t have problems with the browser
, and we don’t want for the 
 
t changes the HTTP Headers of the 
applied method) before sending them into 
-B (the steganogram receiver, SR), 
-B sends the asked webpage “index.html” 
ces aren’t used on the scenario.
 
 using 
’s cache 
 
 The capture will be realized on PC
the capture will always be starting once the first HTTP connection packet for the first 
request is captured. We will be making the same 
with the previous scenario, we will be m
amount of 50 simulations for this scenario).
Again, the secret information that we are sending is
ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quixote de la Mancha”.
We illustrate the second scenario in the figure below.
Figure 32: HTTP Scenario depiction.
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6.2 Analysis of the results 
We will now present a summary of the obtained results, including some charts and 
graphics. We will also discuss them in order to see if we are right or not with our 
hypothesis. All the 90 obtained captures are included in the CD annex to this paper. 
6.2.1 Scenario 1: IP Fragmentation 
For this scenario, we decided to use the total connection time and the distribution of 
the number of fragments obtained per packet in order to measure the steganographic 
cost and its variations. 
These are the time results obtained for the first scenario: 
 
Figure 33: IP Fragmentation, table of times. 
Each obtained time makes reference to the total connection time, from the moment 
when the first ICMP echo request packet is sent, until the moment when the last ICMP 
echo reply is fully received.  As we said, we made 10 different captures per method, 
and so we used them to obtain a mean time and a standard deviation per case. 
Assuming these times follow a normal distribution, we drew the resulting distributions 
for each of the methods, using for it the calculated means and standard deviations: 
No Steganography ICMP Total Time (s) F1 Method Total Time(s) F3 Method Total Time (s) F1+F3 Methods Total time (s)
76,273770 73,102758 79,503706 77,850667
73,996007 73,203190 81,625881 77,906488
73,560484 74,343157 81,470780 77,858460
74,496355 73,456459 81,180423 78,403213
74,557246 72,631783 80,791409 77,948830
74,393596 73,930039 80,160926 79,086417
75,185952 74,227908 80,502305 77,786762
75,948565 73,579992 81,038079 78,239853
74,885760 74,717068 80,750701 78,138004
74,471930 74,294615 80,699552 78,322218
MEAN 74,7769665 73,7486969 80,7723762 78,1540912
STD. DEVIATION 0,790502148 0,6267261 0,592942475 0,372156939
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Figure 34: Time Distribution for each of the Methods, Scenario 1 
We also took measures about other aspects related with the fragments and packets 
distributions for each case, as you can see in the next charts: 
 
Figure 35: Fragment size for each case. 
 
Figure 36: Total number of packets for each case. 
 
Figure 37: Total number of fragments sent for each case. 
 
Figure 38: Number of fragments each packet is fragmented into for each case. 
Of all these measures, we mainly used the ones obtained for the total number of 
fragments sent for each case. 
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48 
 
We will start by analyzing the time results. We can see by looking at Figure 34 that the 
mean connection time is almost the same for the No Steganography and the F1 
Method cases, being this duration bigger for F3 method and for F1 and F3 methods 
combined. 
 If we think about the obtained values, we can tell that something seems strange: the 
logical thinking is that the total connection time for the No Steganography case should 
be smaller than the connection time for the F1 method, but F1 Method’s connection 
mean time is smaller than in the No Steganography case.  Nevertheless, when you 
think about it, this obtained result makes sense: if you check the programming code 
for the No Steganography case and the F1 method case (Annex 1), you will see that 
they are pretty similar. In both cases the whole packet is captured, the random data is 
introduced and both IP and ICMP header checksums are recalculated.  The only 
difference is that, on F1’s case, we sometimes make the whole packet smaller before 
doing all this, which suppose just an extra instruction. Because of the difference 
between both methods’  programming codes being that small, similar connection 
times should be expected in our case, and so a result like the one we obtained (with a 
difference in their mean times that is smaller than a second) is totally plausible. 
We should notice that, if we hadn’t used modified ICMP packets for the No 
Steganography case, the obtained times would have differed more, with the No 
Steganography case’s time being probably a little bit smaller than the F1 method’s 
time.  
We also see that the time obtained for the F3 method is considerably bigger than the 
times obtained for the No Steganography and F1 methods: the connection last for 
around 5 or 6 seconds more. This is logical, since F3 Method is the most complex of the 
used methods, in which we have to calculate in both sides of the connection a hash 
function over an IS (Identifying Sequence) that changes in every iteration. 
So, we have that the No Steganography and F1 Method cases have similar connection 
times, with F3 method case having a connection time that last for about 5 seconds 
longer. In the F1+F3 methods case, when both methods are applied simultaneously, 
the intuition is that the connection will last even longer. However, the resulting 
connection time is only about 3 seconds longer. Therefore the duration of the 
connection in case of the joint methods is shorter as in case of F3  applied alone. This 
implies that if methods F1 and F3 are combined the resulting steganographic cost is 
lower as compared to the steganographic cost of the single method (the one that 
introduces higher steganographic cost). This is the effect we call super-position 
steganography that we wanted to prove with the experiment explained on this paper. 
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 Let us go now with the analysis of the other obtained results. 
The first thing that we analyzed is the size of each of the fragments. We prepared the 
sent packets for this experiment so each and every of the fragments would be of the 
same size: 500 bytes per fragment (not including the 14 Ethernet header bytes). As 
expected, in all the captures, the size of all the fragments is 500 bytes, which is the 
interface fixed MTU for this scenario. 
 Let us talk now about the total number of fragments sent on each of the connections 
(Figure 37). When we compare the distribution of the number of fragments per packet 
the situation is similar to what we obtained when analyzing the times. The F1 method 
introduces irregularities in the number of fragments per packet, while F3 increases the 
overall number of fragments per packet. Since the third-party observer does not 
possess the knowledge of how many fragments the packets will be divided into in 
advance, the F3 technique can be considered less detectable. However it must be 
noted that in the joint-method’s case the resulting number of fragments per packet is 
the same as for the case when F3 is applied alone, as we can see in Figure 37. It is the 
same number of fragments since irregularities introduced by F1 are “smoothed” by the 
second method making the overall steganographic cost for the F1+F3 methods’ case 
the same as for the F3 method’s case. Therefore the overall steganographic cost is not 
elevated. 
We can reach a similar conclusion when analyzing the number of fragments each 
packet is fragmented into (Figure 38). 
6.2.2 Scenario 2: HTTP Connection 
Let us go with scenario 2. Here, what we want to see is that, when combined with F8 
method, F6 and F7 methods are 0-cost steganographic methods. In this scenario, in 
order to analyze the steganographic cost we will be measuring the total connection 
time and the distribution of the HTTP headers size. 
 You can see the different connection times obtained for each of the steganographic 
cases in the next figure: 
 
 Figure 39: HTTP Scenario, t
Each obtained time makes reference
the first SYN TCP packet is sent
ACK is sent closing the last 
each case a mean time and a standard deviation. We drew all the time distributions 
assuming they follow a normal distribution: y
Figure 40: Time distribution for each of the methods, scenario 2.
We also analyzed how the protocol performance 
in order to see if we can proof our 
Header length for each case. In the next chart, you can see the obtained results.
Figure 41: HTTP header lengths for each of the cases.
NoStegHTTP total time (s).
66,826009
66,443482
67,587337
67,587136
67,945304
68,362785
67,575615
68,053174
65,903195
67,159170
MEAN 67,3443207
STD DEVIATION 0,725514862
No Steg F6 method
178 bytes, 900 packets. 178 bytes, 900 packets.
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 starting the first connection, until the moment the last 
one. Just like we did with the first scenario, we obtained for 
ou can see them below. 
was affected by each 
hypothesis. For it, as we told, we analyzed the HTTP 
 
Method F6 total time (s). Method F7 total time (s). Method F8 total time (s).
73,806067 73,983599 73,252588
74,163563 74,020009 72,441612
73,899322 73,358913 72,464690
72,903730 72,750580 73,820218
74,138459 73,042230 73,542648
72,515376 73,981025 73,583339
74,729640 74,352792 72,738383
75,085206 73,456017 72,953182
73,661615 73,978436 74,403576
73,642392 73,294256 72,582144
73,854537 73,6217857 73,178238
0,723907853 0,487735009 0,621871387
F7 method F8 method
178 bytes, 900 packets. 178 bytes, 497 packets.
154 bytes, 403 packets.
HTTP HEADER LENGTH
 
 
 
of the methods, 
 
 
Method F6+F7+F8 total time (s).
72,692545
73,052037
73,849342
73,261461
73,589569
74,834103
74,290865
73,547481
73,548531
73,006379
73,5672313
0,60398567
F6+F7+F8 methods
178 bytes, 511 packets.
154 bytes, 389 packets.
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We will start talking about the obtained times. By inspecting the overall connection 
time we can observe that after applying each of the steganographic methods alone the 
resulting connection time increases by about 6 seconds when comparing it with the No 
Steganography case. The same result is achieved for the F6+F7+F8 combined methods 
case. Therefore simultaneous utilization of all three methods does not influence the 
total connection time. This is the zero cost steganography phenomena we wanted to 
prove with this experiment, and we can understand why are we calling it like that with 
the obtained results: adding additional methods to the existing one does not influence 
the resulting steganographic cost. 
If we analyze the obtained header lengths, we can see that when using F8 method 
alone some irregularities are introduced in HTTP headers sizes. For the F6+F7+F8 
combined methods’ case, where two more methods are added, the irregularities are 
still present but they are similar as in case of F8 method applied alone. Thus we can 
conclude that, in the F6+F7+F8 combined methods’ case, the resulting total 
steganographic cost is not higher than in case of method F8 applied alone.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
Our obtained experimental results show that it is feasible to combine multiple 
steganographic methods to the same carrier in a way that the overall steganographic 
cost caused by these methods is lower as in case of a separate combination of these 
methods (super-position steganography). Results additionally show that multiple 
steganographic methods can be combined with another method without causing any 
additional cost, which is a special case of super-position steganography called zero cost 
steganography. 
This is an important result: knowing about the existence of these two phenomena will 
allow steganalayzers to think about possible ways of countering future steganographic 
techniques that will try to exploit one of these two phenomena where more than one 
steganographic method is combined without making the total steganographic cost 
increase. 
We must also remark that steganography has also some legal usages, so a lot of legal 
organizations (like governments for example) will be able to use superposition 
steganography or zero cost steganography, in order to increase the steganographic 
bandwidth they are obtaining with their actual methods without increasing the 
steganographic cost. 
The results obtained in this thesis have served as a basis of a scientific paper which is 
currently under consideration for publication in Security and Communication Networks 
Journal [11]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
ANNEX 1: PROGRAMMING CODE 
We will be including all the implemented programming code in this section. We will 
start by showing the parts of the code that are common to all of the cases, in both 
transmission and reception: needed libraries and common variables, the code related 
with the GTK graphic interface, the different functions we implemented and the main 
program. After that, we will focus on one of the functions, function which is different 
depending on the used method, and on if we are on the sending or on the receiving 
side. We will finally present the full compilation line that we have to use in order to 
compile our programs. 
• Needed libraries and common variables 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include <netinet/in.h> 
#include <linux/netfilter.h> 
#include <libnetfilter_queue/libnetfilter_queue.h> 
#include <gtk/gtk.h> 
 
#include <iostream> 
 
using namespace std; 
 
//Variables 
//Variables must be static and global 
//so they can be seen in every threat 
 
#define YES_IT_IS    (1) 
#define NO_IT_IS_NOT (0) 
typedef unsigned short u16; 
char buf[4096]; 
unsigned char dane[4096]; 
int rv; 
int i, tmp; 
 
struct nfq_handle *h; 
struct nfq_q_handle *qh; 
struct nfnl_handle *nh; 
int fd; 
 
 
//global GTK variables 
GtkWidget *window; 
GtkWidget *label_iptables_control; 
GtkWidget *text; 
GtkWidget *vbox; 
GtkTextBuffer *buffer; 
GtkTextIter iter; 
 
GtkTextMark *insert_mark; 
GtkWidget *table; 
GtkWidget *button_iptables_INPUT_add; 
GtkWidget *button_iptables_INPUT_delete; 
GtkWidget *button_iptables_OUTPUT_add; 
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GtkWidget *button_iptables_OUTPUT_delete; 
GtkWidget *button_iptables_FORWARD_add; 
GtkWidget *button_iptables_FORWARD_delete; 
GtkWidget *port;  
GtkWidget *port_label; 
 
• Function unsignedShortToInt, which converses an unsigned short char variable 
into an int variable 
//Short to Int 
static unsigned int unsignedShortToInt(unsigned char b[]) 
{ 
    int i = 0; 
    i |= b[0] & 0xFF; 
    i <<= 8; 
    i |= b[1] & 0xFF; 
    return i; 
} 
 
• Function csum, which calculates the total sum for the IP/ICMP/TCP checksum 
//Part of checksum 
unsigned short csum (unsigned short *buf, int nwords) 
{ 
    unsigned long sum; 
    for (sum = 0; nwords > 0; nwords--)  
    { 
        sum += *buf++; 
    } 
    sum = (sum >> 16) + (sum & 0xffff);   
    sum += (sum >> 16); 
     
    return ((unsigned short) ~sum); 
} 
 
• GTK related functions. 
typedef struct 
{ 
    GtkWidget *label; 
    int what; 
} yes_or_no_args; 
 
G_LOCK_DEFINE_STATIC (yes_or_no); 
static volatile int yes_or_no = YES_IT_IS; 
 
void destroy(GtkWidget *widget, gpointer data) 
{ 
    gtk_main_quit(); 
} 
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//main thread for net 
void *network_thread(void *args) 
{ 
     
    //main loop for packets 
    while ((rv = recv(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0)) && rv >= 0) { 
         
 //packet handler   
      nfq_handle_packet(h, buf, rv); 
         
    } 
} 
 
 
//action for button IPtables OUTPUT Add 
void akcja_iptables_OUTPUT_add(GtkWidget *widget, gpointer 
window) 
{ 
    system("iptables -A OUTPUT -p icmp -j QUEUE"); 
    gtk_text_buffer_insert(buffer, &iter, "[ON] Enabled IPtables 
OUTPUT\n", -1); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_INPUT_add,false); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_OUTPUT_add,false); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_FORWARD_add,false); 
    
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_INPUT_delete,false); 
    
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_FORWARD_delete,false); 
     
     
     
} 
 
//action for button IPtables OUTPUT Delete 
void akcja_iptables_OUTPUT_delete(GtkWidget *widget, gpointer 
window) 
{ 
    system("iptables -D OUTPUT -p icmp -j QUEUE"); 
    gtk_text_buffer_insert(buffer, &iter, "[OFF] Disabled 
IPtables OUTPUT\n", -1); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_INPUT_add,true); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_OUTPUT_add,true); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_FORWARD_add,true); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_INPUT_delete,true); 
    
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_OUTPUT_delete,true); 
    
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_FORWARD_delete,true); 
     
} 
 
 
 
//action for button IPtables INPUT Add 
void akcja_iptables_INPUT_add(GtkWidget *widget, gpointer 
window) 
{ 
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    system("iptables -A INPUT -p icmp -j QUEUE"); 
    gtk_text_buffer_insert(buffer, &iter, "[ON] Enabled IPtables 
INPUT\n", -1); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_INPUT_add,false); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_OUTPUT_add,false); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_FORWARD_add,false); 
    
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_OUTPUT_delete,false); 
    
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_FORWARD_delete,false); 
} 
 
//action for button IPtables INPUT Delete 
void akcja_iptables_INPUT_delete(GtkWidget *widget, gpointer 
window) 
{ 
    system("iptables -D INPUT -p icmp -j QUEUE"); 
    gtk_text_buffer_insert(buffer, &iter, "[OFF] Disabled 
IPtables INPUT\n", -1); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_INPUT_add,true); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_OUTPUT_add,true); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_FORWARD_add,true); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_INPUT_delete,true); 
    
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_OUTPUT_delete,true); 
    
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_FORWARD_delete,true); 
     
} 
 
 
 
//action for button IPtables FORWARD Add 
void akcja_iptables_FORWARD_add(GtkWidget *widget, gpointer 
window) 
{ 
    system("iptables -A FORWARD -p icmp -j QUEUE"); 
    gtk_text_buffer_insert(buffer, &iter, "[ON] Enabled IPtables 
FORWARD\n", -1); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_INPUT_add,false); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_OUTPUT_add,false); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_FORWARD_add,false); 
    
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_INPUT_delete,false); 
    
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_OUTPUT_delete,false); 
} 
 
//action for button IPtables FORWARD Delete 
void akcja_iptables_FORWARD_delete(GtkWidget *widget, gpointer 
window) 
{ 
    system("iptables -D FORWARD -p icmp -j QUEUE"); 
    gtk_text_buffer_insert(buffer, &iter, "[OFF] Disabled 
IPtables FORWARD\n", -1); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_INPUT_add,true); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_OUTPUT_add,true); 
    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_FORWARD_add,true); 
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    gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_INPUT_delete,true); 
    
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_OUTPUT_delete,true); 
    
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(button_iptables_FORWARD_delete,true); 
     
} 
 
• Main function, which calls the graphic interface for modifying the packets 
//main program function 
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
 
system("clear"); 
 
    //adding netfilter module for kernel 
    int result =  system("modprobe iptable_filter"); 
     
    GError *error = NULL; 
    yes_or_no_args yes_args, no_args; 
     
    /* init threads */ 
    g_thread_init(NULL); 
    gdk_threads_init(); 
     
    /* init gtk */ 
    gtk_init(&argc, &argv); 
     
    /* create a window */ 
    window = gtk_window_new(GTK_WINDOW_TOPLEVEL); 
    gtk_window_set_title (GTK_WINDOW(window), "Packet 
modifier"); 
    gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(window), 
GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER); 
    gtk_widget_set_size_request (window, 450, 450); 
    gtk_window_set_resizable(GTK_WINDOW(window), TRUE); 
     
    text = gtk_text_view_new(); 
    gtk_text_view_set_editable(GTK_TEXT_VIEW (text), FALSE); 
    port = gtk_entry_new(); 
    gtk_entry_set_text(GTK_ENTRY(port),"1234"); 
 port_label = gtk_label_new("DST UDP PORT:"); 
 
    buffer = gtk_text_view_get_buffer(GTK_TEXT_VIEW(text)); 
   
    gtk_text_buffer_get_iter_at_offset(buffer, &iter, 0); 
     
 
    GtkWidget *scrolled_window; 
    scrolled_window = gtk_scrolled_window_new (NULL, NULL); 
gtk_scrolled_window_set_policy (GTK_SCROLLED_WINDOW 
(scrolled_window),GTK_POLICY_AUTOMATIC, GTK_POLICY_ALWAYS); 
     
    gtk_scrolled_window_add_with_viewport (GTK_SCROLLED_WINDOW 
(scrolled_window), text); 
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    g_signal_connect(window, "destroy",G_CALLBACK(destroy), 
NULL); 
     
    gtk_container_set_border_width(GTK_CONTAINER (window), 10); 
     
    table = gtk_table_new(4, 3, TRUE); 
    gtk_table_set_row_spacings(GTK_TABLE(table), 2); 
    gtk_table_set_col_spacings(GTK_TABLE(table), 2); 
         
     
gtk_table_attach_defaults(GTK_TABLE(table), 
label_iptables_control, 1, 2, 0, 1 ); 
    button_iptables_OUTPUT_add = 
gtk_button_new_with_label("OUTPUT [ON]"); 
    button_iptables_OUTPUT_delete = 
gtk_button_new_with_label("OUTPUT [OFF]"); 
     
    button_iptables_INPUT_add = gtk_button_new_with_label("INPUT 
[ON]"); 
    button_iptables_INPUT_delete = 
gtk_button_new_with_label("INPUT [OFF]"); 
     
    button_iptables_FORWARD_add = 
gtk_button_new_with_label("FORWARD [ON]"); 
    button_iptables_FORWARD_delete = 
gtk_button_new_with_label("FORWARD [OFF]"); 
     
         
    gtk_table_attach_defaults(GTK_TABLE(table), 
button_iptables_OUTPUT_add , 1, 2, 1, 2 ); 
    gtk_table_attach_defaults(GTK_TABLE(table), 
button_iptables_OUTPUT_delete , 2, 3, 1, 2 ); 
     
    gtk_table_attach_defaults(GTK_TABLE(table), 
button_iptables_INPUT_add , 1, 2, 2, 3 ); 
    gtk_table_attach_defaults(GTK_TABLE(table), 
button_iptables_INPUT_delete , 2, 3, 2, 3 ); 
     
    gtk_table_attach_defaults(GTK_TABLE(table), 
button_iptables_FORWARD_add , 1, 2, 3, 4 ); 
    gtk_table_attach_defaults(GTK_TABLE(table), 
button_iptables_FORWARD_delete , 2, 3, 3, 4 ); 
     
    gtk_table_attach_defaults(GTK_TABLE(table), port_label , 0, 
1, 1, 2 ); 
    gtk_table_attach_defaults(GTK_TABLE(table), port , 0, 1, 2, 
3 ); 
     
    vbox = gtk_vbox_new(FALSE, 1); 
    gtk_container_add(GTK_CONTAINER(window), vbox); 
     
     
     
    gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(vbox), scrolled_window, TRUE, 
TRUE, 0); 
    gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(vbox), table, FALSE, FALSE, 0); 
     
    gtk_widget_show_all(window); 
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    //acctions for buttons 
    g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(button_iptables_OUTPUT_add), 
"clicked", G_CALLBACK(akcja_iptables_OUTPUT_add), (gpointer) 
window); 
    g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(button_iptables_OUTPUT_delete), 
"clicked", G_CALLBACK(akcja_iptables_OUTPUT_delete), (gpointer) 
window); 
    g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(button_iptables_INPUT_add), 
"clicked", G_CALLBACK(akcja_iptables_INPUT_add), (gpointer) 
window); 
    g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(button_iptables_INPUT_delete), 
"clicked", G_CALLBACK(akcja_iptables_INPUT_delete), (gpointer) 
window); 
    g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(button_iptables_FORWARD_add), 
"clicked", G_CALLBACK(akcja_iptables_FORWARD_add), (gpointer) 
window); 
    g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(button_iptables_FORWARD_delete), 
"clicked", G_CALLBACK(akcja_iptables_FORWARD_delete), (gpointer) 
window); 
     
     
     
         
     
     
    //printf("opening library handle\n"); 
    h = nfq_open(); 
    if (!h) { 
        fprintf(stderr, "error during nfq_open()\n"); 
        exit(1); 
    } 
     
    //printf("unbinding existing nf_queue handler for AF_INET 
(if any)\n"); 
    if (nfq_unbind_pf(h, AF_INET) < 0) { 
        fprintf(stderr, "error during nfq_unbind_pf()\n"); 
        exit(1); 
    } 
     
    //printf("binding nfnetlink_queue as nf_queue handler for 
AF_INET\n"); 
    if (nfq_bind_pf(h, AF_INET) < 0) { 
        fprintf(stderr, "error during nfq_bind_pf()\n"); 
        exit(1); 
    } 
     
    //printf("binding this socket to queue '0'\n"); 
    qh = nfq_create_queue(h,  0, &cb, NULL); 
    if (!qh) { 
        fprintf(stderr, "error during nfq_create_queue()\n"); 
        exit(1); 
    } 
     
    //printf("setting copy_packet mode\n"); 
    if (nfq_set_mode(qh, NFQNL_COPY_PACKET, 0xffff) < 0) { 
        fprintf(stderr, "can't set packet_copy mode\n"); 
        exit(1); 
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    } 
     
    nh = nfq_nfnlh(h); 
    fd = nfnl_fd(nh); 
     
    
    //therad for net 
    if (!g_thread_create(network_thread, &yes_args, FALSE, 
&error)) 
    { 
        g_printerr ("Failed to create NET thread: %s\n", error-
>message); 
        return 1; 
    } 
     
   
    //main GTK loop 
    gdk_threads_enter(); 
    gtk_main(); 
  
    gdk_threads_leave(); 
//} 
     
    return 0; 
} 
 
• ICMP No Steganography case, main function for modifying the packets,sender 
side 
int trigger=2; 
 
//MAIN FUNCTION FOR modyfying packets 
static int cb(struct nfq_q_handle *qh, struct nfgenmsg 
*nfmsg, 
              struct nfq_data *nfa, void *data) 
{ 
     
    char *data2; 
    int ret = nfq_get_payload(nfa, &data2); 
    if (ret >= 0) 
         
        for(int i=0; i<ret; i++) 
        { 
            dane[i] = (unsigned char)data2[i]; 
           
 } 
 
if (trigger>=0) 
 { 
 srand(8); 
 } 
 
for (int i=28; i<ret; i++) 
 { 
 dane[i]=rand()%16; 
 } 
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trigger=trigger-1; 
             
            //IP checksum 
            u16 ip_header[10]; 
             
            dane[10] = 0x00; 
            dane[11] = 0x00; 
             
            for(int i=0; i<10; i++) 
            { 
                ip_header[i] = unsignedShortToInt(dane+2*i); 
            } 
             
            u16 ip_header_sum = csum(ip_header,10); 
            u16 ip_header_sum_begin = ip_header_sum; 
            ip_header_sum_begin >>= 8; 
            dane[10] = ip_header_sum_begin; 
            dane[11] = ip_header_sum; 
 
            //ICMP checksum 
            u16 icmp_message[(ret-20)/2]; 
             
            dane[22] = 0x00; 
            dane[23] = 0x00; 
             
            for(int i=0; i<(ret-20)/2; i++) 
            { 
                icmp_message[i] = 
unsignedShortToInt(dane+20+2*i); 
            } 
             
            u16 icmp_message_sum = csum(icmp_message,(ret-
20)/2); 
            u16 icmp_message_sum_begin = icmp_message_sum; 
            icmp_message_sum_begin >>= 8; 
            dane[22] = icmp_message_sum_begin; 
            dane[23] = icmp_message_sum; 
            
gtk_text_buffer_insert(buffer, &iter, "Packet captured\n", -
1); 
  
    return nfq_set_verdict(qh, id, NF_ACCEPT, ret, dane); 
} 
 
• ICMP No Steganography case, main function for modifying the packets, receiver 
side 
//MAIN FUNCTION FOR modyfying packets 
static int cb(struct nfq_q_handle *qh, struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg, 
              struct nfq_data *nfa, void *data) 
{ 
  
   
    char *data2; 
    int ret = nfq_get_payload(nfa, &data2); 
    if (ret >= 0) 
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        for(int i=0; i<ret; i++) 
        { 
            dane[i] = (unsigned char)data2[i];               
    } 
  
if (trigger==0) 
{ 
dane[1]=dane[1]; 
std::cout<< " "; 
} 
  
else if (trigger!=0) 
{ 
trigger=trigger-1; 
} 
  
gtk_text_buffer_insert(buffer, &iter, "Packet captured\n", -1); 
   
    return nfq_set_verdict(qh, id, NF_ACCEPT, ret, dane); 
} 
 
• F1 Method case, main function for modifying the packets, sender side 
 
//Introduce a message made with 1’s and 0’s. 
int message[]={} 
int position=0; 
int length=sizeof(message)/sizeof(message[0]); 
int trigger=2; 
 
//MAIN FUNCTION FOR modyfying packets 
static int cb(struct nfq_q_handle *qh, struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg, 
              struct nfq_data *nfa, void *data) 
{ 
  
    char *data2; 
    int ret = nfq_get_payload(nfa, &data2); 
    if (ret >= 0) 
          
        for(int i=0; i<ret; i++) 
        { 
            dane[i] = (unsigned char)data2[i]; 
                  
    } 
  
if (trigger>=0) 
    { 
    srand(8); 
    } 
  
  
if (message[position]==1) 
    { 
    ret=1460; 
    } 
  
for (int i=28; i<ret; i++) 
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    { 
    dane[i]=rand()%16; 
    } 
              
            //IP checksum 
            u16 ip_header[10]; 
              
            dane[10] = 0x00; 
            dane[11] = 0x00; 
              
            for(int i=0; i<10; i++) 
            { 
                ip_header[i] = unsignedShortToInt(dane+2*i); 
            } 
              
            u16 ip_header_sum = csum(ip_header,10); 
            u16 ip_header_sum_begin = ip_header_sum; 
            ip_header_sum_begin >>= 8; 
            dane[10] = ip_header_sum_begin; 
            dane[11] = ip_header_sum; 
  
            //ICMP checksum 
            u16 icmp_message[(ret-20)/2]; 
              
            dane[22] = 0x00; 
            dane[23] = 0x00; 
              
            for(int i=0; i<(ret-20)/2; i++) 
            { 
                icmp_message[i] = 
unsignedShortToInt(dane+20+2*i); 
            } 
              
            u16 icmp_message_sum = csum(icmp_message,(ret-
20)/2); 
            u16 icmp_message_sum_begin = icmp_message_sum; 
            icmp_message_sum_begin >>= 8; 
            dane[22] = icmp_message_sum_begin; 
            dane[23] = icmp_message_sum; 
  
  
if (trigger<=0) 
{ 
position=position+1; 
} 
  
trigger=trigger-1; 
  
if(position==length) 
    { 
    position=0; 
    //system("iptables -D OUTPUT -p icmp -j QUEUE"); 
    }    
  
             
gtk_text_buffer_insert(buffer, &iter, "Packet captured\n", -1); 
   
    return nfq_set_verdict(qh, id, NF_ACCEPT, ret, dane); 
} 
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• F1 method case, main function for modifying the packets, receiver side 
int message[4096]; 
int position=0; 
int trigger=2; 
 
//MAIN FUNCTION FOR modyfying packets 
static int cb(struct nfq_q_handle *qh, struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg, 
              struct nfq_data *nfa, void *data) 
{ 
  
  
   char *data2; 
    int ret = nfq_get_payload(nfa, &data2); 
    if (ret >= 0) 
          
        for(int i=0; i<ret; i++) 
        { 
            dane[i] = (unsigned char)data2[i]; 
                  
    } 
  
if (trigger==2) 
    { 
    std::cout<< "\nThe secret message received is, starting from 
the third digit: "; 
    } 
  
if (ret==1940) 
    { 
    message[position]=0; 
    std::cout<<message[position];      
    } 
  
else if (ret==1460) 
    { 
    message[position]=1; 
    std::cout<<message[position];  
    } 
  
if (trigger<=0) 
{ 
position=position+1; 
} 
  
trigger=trigger-1; 
  
gtk_text_buffer_insert(buffer, &iter, "Packet captured\n", -1); 
   
    return nfq_set_verdict(qh, id, NF_ACCEPT, ret, dane); 
} 
 
 
 
• F3 method case, main function for modifying the packets, sender side 
//Introduce a message made with 1’s and 0’s. 
int message[]={} 
int length=sizeof(message)/sizeof(message[0]); 
int position=0; 
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unsigned char sk[2]={0x56,0x65}; 
char IS[5]={0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}; 
unsigned long int change=0; 
char ISaux[10]; 
int trigger=2; 
  
//MAIN FUNCTION FOR modyfying packets 
static int cb(struct nfq_q_handle *qh, struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg, 
              struct nfq_data *nfa, void *data) 
{ 
  
    char *data2; 
    int ret = nfq_get_payload(nfa, &data2); 
    if (ret >= 0) 
          
        for(int i=0; i<ret; i++) 
        { 
            dane[i] = (unsigned char)data2[i]; 
                  
    } 
  
if (trigger>=0) 
    { 
         srand(8); 
    } 
  
//PACKET modification  
for (int i=28; i<500; i++) 
    { 
    dane[i]=rand()%16; 
    } 
  
for (int i=980; i<1940; i++) 
    { 
    dane[i]=rand()%16; 
    } 
      
for (int i=0; i<5; i++) 
    {    
        if (i<2) 
        { 
        IS[i]=sk[i]; 
        } 
    else if (i==2) 
        { 
        IS[i]=0x3c; 
        } 
    else if (2<i<5) 
        { 
        IS[i]=dane[i+1]; 
        } 
    } 
  
std::string chain (IS); 
std::hash<std::string> final; 
  
size_t hashed=final(IS); 
  
change=hashed; 
  
sprintf(ISaux,"%ld",change); 
  
for (int i=0;i<4;i++) 
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    { 
    dane[i+500]=ISaux[i]; 
    } 
  
  
for (int i=504; i<980; i++) 
    { 
    dane[i]=message[i-504+position]; 
    }  
  
if (trigger<=0) 
{ 
position=position+476; 
} 
  
trigger=trigger-1; 
  
if(position>=length-476) 
    { 
    position=0; 
    //system("iptables -D OUTPUT -p icmp -j QUEUE"); 
    }    
  
            //IP checksum 
            u16 ip_header[10]; 
              
            dane[10] = 0x00; 
            dane[11] = 0x00; 
              
            for(int i=0; i<10; i++) 
            { 
                ip_header[i] = unsignedShortToInt(dane+2*i); 
            } 
              
            u16 ip_header_sum = csum(ip_header,10); 
            u16 ip_header_sum_begin = ip_header_sum; 
            ip_header_sum_begin >>= 8; 
            dane[10] = ip_header_sum_begin; 
            dane[11] = ip_header_sum; 
  
            //ICMP checksum 
            u16 icmp_message[960]; 
              
            dane[22] = 0x00; 
            dane[23] = 0x00; 
              
            for(int i=0; i<960; i++) 
            { 
                icmp_message[i] = unsignedShortToInt(dane+20+2*i); 
            } 
              
            u16 icmp_message_sum = csum(icmp_message,960); 
            u16 icmp_message_sum_begin = icmp_message_sum; 
            icmp_message_sum_begin >>= 8; 
            dane[22] = icmp_message_sum_begin; 
            dane[23] = icmp_message_sum; 
              
gtk_text_buffer_insert(buffer, &iter, "Packet captured\n", -1); 
  
  
       
    return nfq_set_verdict(qh, id, NF_ACCEPT, ret, dane); 
} 
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• F3 Method case, main function for modifying the packets, receiver side 
int message[4096]; 
int length=324573; 
int position=0; 
unsigned char sk[2]={0x56,0x65}; 
char IS[5]={0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}; 
unsigned long int change=0; 
char ISaux[10]; 
unsigned char IScomp[10]; 
int trigger=2; 
 
//MAIN FUNCTION FOR modyfying packets 
static int cb(struct nfq_q_handle *qh, struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg, 
              struct nfq_data *nfa, void *data) 
{ 
  
  
    u_int32_t id = print_pkt(nfa); 
    //printf("entering callback\n"); 
      
    char *data2; 
    int ret = nfq_get_payload(nfa, &data2); 
    if (ret >= 0) 
          
        for(int i=0; i<ret; i++) 
        { 
            dane[i] = (unsigned char)data2[i]; 
                  
    } 
       
  
//PACKET modification 
if (trigger==2) 
    { 
    std::cout<< "\nThe secret message received is, starting from 
the third digit: "; 
    } 
  
for (int i=0; i<500; i++) 
    { 
    dane2[i]=dane[i]; 
    } 
  
for (int i=980; i<1940; i++) 
    { 
    dane2[i-480]=dane[i]; 
    } 
  
  
for (int i=0;i<5;i++) 
    { 
    if (i<2) 
        { 
        IS[i]=sk[i]; 
        } 
    else if (i==2) 
        { 
        IS[i]=0x3c; 
        } 
    else if (2<i<5) 
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        { 
        IS[i]=dane[i+1]; 
        } 
    } 
  
std::string chain (IS); 
std::hash<std::string> final; 
  
size_t hashed=final(IS); 
  
change=hashed; 
  
sprintf(ISaux,"%ld",change); 
  
for (int i=0; i<4;i++) 
    { 
    IScomp[i]=ISaux[i]; 
    }        
  
if ((dane[500]==(IScomp[0])) && (dane[501]==(IScomp[1])) && 
(dane[502]==(IScomp[2])) && (dane[503]==(IScomp[3]))) 
  
    { 
    //length=dane[505]; 
    for (int i=0; i<476; i++) 
        { 
        message[i+position]=dane[i+504]; 
        std::cout<<message[i+position]; 
        } 
    if (trigger<=0) 
        { 
        position=position+476; 
        } 
    } 
  
if (position==length-1) 
    { 
        system("iptables -D INPUT -p icmp -j QUEUE"); 
    std::cout<< ".\n"; 
    } 
  
trigger=trigger-1; 
              
gtk_text_buffer_insert(buffer, &iter, "Packet captured\n", -1); 
  
       
    return nfq_set_verdict(qh, id, NF_ACCEPT, ret, dane); 
} 
 
 
When combining F1 and F3 Methods, we use the previously shown code combined. 
 
• F6 Method case, main function for modifying the packets, sender side 
//Introduce a message made with 1’s and 0’s. 
int message[]={}; 
int length=sizeof(message)/sizeof(message[0]); 
int puntero=143; 
int punteromessage=0; 
int trigger=1; 
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//MAIN FUNCTION FOR modyfying packets 
static int cb(struct nfq_q_handle *qh, struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg, 
              struct nfq_data *nfa, void *data) 
{ 
  
  
    u_int32_t id = print_pkt(nfa); 
    //printf("entering callback\n"); 
      
    char *data2; 
    int ret = nfq_get_payload(nfa, &data2); 
    if (ret >= 0) 
          
        for(int i=0; i<ret; i++) 
        { 
            dane[i] = (unsigned char)data2[i]; 
                  
    } 
       
//Checking if this is desired port p will be port number from 
window field. packet will be sent without modification 
int p = atoi((char*) gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(port))); 
//porrt is 16 bit number so two unsigned char for 8 older bits and 
and 8 younger bits must be compared to desired port 
if ((dane[22]==(p>>8))&&(dane[23]==(p&255))&& (ret>60)) 
{ 
if (trigger==0) 
{ 
for (int i=0; i<5; i++) 
    { 
  
    if (message[punteromessage+i]==0) 
        { 
        if (dane[puntero]<=0x5a) 
            { 
            dane[puntero]=dane[puntero]+0x20; 
            } 
        } 
      
    else if (message[punteromessage+i]==1) 
        { 
        if (dane[puntero]>0x5a) 
            { 
            dane[puntero]=dane[puntero]-0x20; 
            } 
        }    
      
    puntero=puntero+1; 
    } 
  
puntero=143; 
punteromessage=punteromessage+5; 
length=length-5; 
if (length==0) 
    { 
    length=sizeof(message)/sizeof(message[0]); 
    punteromessage=0;     
    //system("iptables -D OUTPUT -p TCP -j QUEUE"); 
    }    
              
            //IP checksum 
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            u16 ip_header[10]; 
              
            dane[10] = 0x00; 
            dane[11] = 0x00; 
              
            for(int i=0; i<10; i++) 
            { 
                ip_header[i] = unsignedShortToInt(dane+2*i); 
            } 
              
            u16 ip_header_sum = csum(ip_header,10); 
            u16 ip_header_sum_begin = ip_header_sum; 
            ip_header_sum_begin >>= 8; 
            dane[10] = ip_header_sum_begin; 
            dane[11] = ip_header_sum; 
              
        //TCP checksum 
            u16 tcp_header[((ret-20)/2)+6]; 
              
            dane[36] = 0x00; 
            dane[37] = 0x00; 
  
        danetcp[0] = 0x00; 
        danetcp[1] = dane[9]; 
              
            for(int i=0; i<(ret-20)/2; i++) 
            { 
                tcp_header[i] = unsignedShortToInt(dane+20+2*i); 
            } 
  
            for(int i=0; i<4; i++) 
            { 
                tcp_header[i+(ret-20)/2] = 
unsignedShortToInt(dane+12+2*i); 
            } 
  
        tcp_header[((ret-20)/2)+4]= unsignedShortToInt(danetcp); 
  
        tcp_header[((ret-20)/2)+5]= ret-20; 
              
            u16 tcp_header_sum = csum(tcp_header,((ret-20)/2)+6); 
            u16 tcp_header_sum_begin = tcp_header_sum; 
            tcp_header_sum_begin >>= 8; 
            dane[36] = tcp_header_sum_begin; 
            dane[37] = tcp_header_sum; 
} 
  
else if (trigger!=0) 
{ 
trigger=trigger-1; 
} 
      
gtk_text_buffer_insert(buffer, &iter, "Packet captured\n", -1); 
} 
      
    return nfq_set_verdict(qh, id, NF_ACCEPT, ret, dane); 
} 
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• F6 method case, main function for modifying the packets, receiver side 
int message[4096]; 
int puntero=143; 
int punteromessage=0; 
int trigger=1; 
 
//MAIN FUNCTION FOR modyfying packets 
static int cb(struct nfq_q_handle *qh, struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg, 
              struct nfq_data *nfa, void *data) 
{ 
  
  
    u_int32_t id = print_pkt(nfa); 
    //printf("entering callback\n"); 
      
    char *data2; 
    int ret = nfq_get_payload(nfa, &data2); 
    if (ret >= 0) 
          
        for(int i=0; i<ret; i++) 
        { 
            dane[i] = (unsigned char)data2[i]; 
                  
    } 
       
//Checking if this is desired port p will be port number from 
window field. packet will be sent without modification 
int p = atoi((char*) gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(port))); 
//porrt is 16 bit number so two unsigned char for 8 older bits and 
and 8 younger bits must be compared to desired port 
if ((dane[22]==(p>>8))&&(dane[23]==(p&255))&& (ret>60)) 
{ 
  
if (trigger==0) 
{ 
for (int i=0; i<5; i++) 
    { 
    if (dane[puntero+i]>0x5a) 
        { 
        message[punteromessage]=0; 
        std::cout<<message[punteromessage]; 
        punteromessage=punteromessage+1; 
        } 
  
    else if (dane[puntero+i]<=0x5a) 
        { 
        message[punteromessage]=1; 
        std::cout<<message[punteromessage]; 
        punteromessage=punteromessage+1; 
        }    
    } 
              
} 
  
else if (trigger!=0) 
{ 
std::cout<< "\nThe secret message received is: "; 
trigger=trigger-1; 
} 
      
gtk_text_buffer_insert(buffer, &iter, "Packet captured\n", -1); 
72 
 
} 
      
    return nfq_set_verdict(qh, id, NF_ACCEPT, ret, dane); 
} 
  
 
• F7 Method case, main function for modifying the packets, Sender side 
 
//Introduce a message made with 1’s and 0’s. 
 
int message[]={}; 
int length=sizeof(message)/sizeof(message[0]); 
int puntero=175; 
int punteromessage=0; 
int trigger=1; 
 
//MAIN FUNCTION FOR modyfying packets 
static int cb(struct nfq_q_handle *qh, struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg, 
              struct nfq_data *nfa, void *data) 
{ 
  
  
    u_int32_t id = print_pkt(nfa); 
    //printf("entering callback\n"); 
      
    char *data2; 
    int ret = nfq_get_payload(nfa, &data2); 
    if (ret >= 0) 
          
        for(int i=0; i<ret; i++) 
        { 
            dane[i] = (unsigned char)data2[i]; 
                  
    } 
       
//Checking if this is desired port p will be port number from 
window field. packet will be sent without modification 
int p = atoi((char*) gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(port))); 
//porrt is 16 bit number so two unsigned char for 8 older bits and 
and 8 younger bits must be compared to desired port 
if ((dane[22]==(p>>8))&&(dane[23]==(p&255))&& (ret>60)) 
{ 
  
if (trigger==0) 
{ 
  
if (message[punteromessage]==1) 
    { 
    for (int i=0; i<13;i++) 
        { 
        daneaux[i]=dane[puntero+i]; 
        } 
  
    for (int i=0; i<16;i++) 
        { 
        dane[puntero+i]=dane[puntero+i+13]; 
        } 
  
    for (int i=16;i<29;i++) 
        { 
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        dane[puntero+i]=daneaux[i-16]; 
        } 
    } 
  
punteromessage=punteromessage+1; 
length=length-1; 
if (length==0) 
    { 
    length=sizeof(message)/sizeof(message[0]); 
    punteromessage=0;     
    //system("iptables -D OUTPUT -p TCP -j QUEUE"); 
    }    
   
           //IP checksum 
            u16 ip_header[10]; 
              
            dane[10] = 0x00; 
            dane[11] = 0x00; 
              
            for(int i=0; i<10; i++) 
            { 
                ip_header[i] = unsignedShortToInt(dane+2*i); 
            } 
              
            u16 ip_header_sum = csum(ip_header,10); 
            u16 ip_header_sum_begin = ip_header_sum; 
            ip_header_sum_begin >>= 8; 
            dane[10] = ip_header_sum_begin; 
            dane[11] = ip_header_sum; 
              
        //TCP checksum 
            u16 tcp_header[((ret-20)/2)+6]; 
              
            dane[36] = 0x00; 
            dane[37] = 0x00; 
  
        danetcp[0] = 0x00; 
        danetcp[1] = dane[9]; 
              
            for(int i=0; i<(ret-20)/2; i++) 
            { 
                tcp_header[i] = unsignedShortToInt(dane+20+2*i); 
            } 
  
            for(int i=0; i<4; i++) 
            { 
                tcp_header[i+(ret-20)/2] = 
unsignedShortToInt(dane+12+2*i); 
            } 
  
        tcp_header[((ret-20)/2)+4]= unsignedShortToInt(danetcp); 
  
        tcp_header[((ret-20)/2)+5]= ret-20; 
              
            u16 tcp_header_sum = csum(tcp_header,((ret-20)/2)+6); 
            u16 tcp_header_sum_begin = tcp_header_sum; 
            tcp_header_sum_begin >>= 8; 
            dane[36] = tcp_header_sum_begin; 
            dane[37] = tcp_header_sum; 
} 
  
else if (trigger!=0) 
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{ 
trigger=trigger-1; 
} 
      
gtk_text_buffer_insert(buffer, &iter, "Packet captured\n", -1); 
} 
  
       
    return nfq_set_verdict(qh, id, NF_ACCEPT, ret, dane); 
} 
 
• F7 method case, main function for modifying the packets, receiver side 
 
int message[4096]; 
int puntero=175; 
int punteromessage=0; 
int trigger=1; 
  
//MAIN FUNCTION FOR modyfying packets 
static int cb(struct nfq_q_handle *qh, struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg, 
              struct nfq_data *nfa, void *data) 
{ 
  
  
    u_int32_t id = print_pkt(nfa); 
    //printf("entering callback\n"); 
      
    char *data2; 
    int ret = nfq_get_payload(nfa, &data2); 
    if (ret >= 0) 
          
        for(int i=0; i<ret; i++) 
        { 
            dane[i] = (unsigned char)data2[i]; 
                  
    } 
       
//Checking if this is desired port p will be port number from 
window field. packet will be sent without modification 
int p = atoi((char*) gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(port))); 
//porrt is 16 bit number so two unsigned char for 8 older bits and 
and 8 younger bits must be compared to desired port 
if ((dane[22]==(p>>8))&&(dane[23]==(p&255))&& (ret>60)) 
{ 
  
if (trigger==0) 
{ 
  
if (dane[puntero]==0x41) 
    { 
    message[punteromessage]=0; 
    std::cout<<message[punteromessage]; 
    punteromessage=punteromessage+1; 
    } 
  
else if (dane[puntero]==0x48) 
    { 
    message[punteromessage]=1; 
    std::cout<<message[punteromessage]; 
    punteromessage=punteromessage+1; 
    } 
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} 
  
else if (trigger!=0) 
{ 
std::cout<< "\nThe secret message received is: "; 
trigger=trigger-1; 
} 
  
  
      
gtk_text_buffer_insert(buffer, &iter, "Packet captured\n", -1); 
} 
  
       
    return nfq_set_verdict(qh, id, NF_ACCEPT, ret, dane); 
} 
 
• F8 method case, main function for modifying the packets, sender side 
//Introduce a message made with 1’s and 0’s. 
int message[]={} 
int length=sizeof(message)/sizeof(message[0]); 
int puntero=175; 
int punteromessage=0; 
int trigger=1; 
 
//MAIN FUNCTION FOR modyfying packets 
static int cb(struct nfq_q_handle *qh, struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg, 
              struct nfq_data *nfa, void *data) 
{ 
  
  
    u_int32_t id = print_pkt(nfa); 
    //printf("entering callback\n"); 
      
    char *data2; 
    int ret = nfq_get_payload(nfa, &data2); 
    if (ret >= 0) 
          
        for(int i=0; i<ret; i++) 
        { 
            dane[i] = (unsigned char)data2[i]; 
                  
    } 
       
//Checking if this is desired port p will be port number from 
window field. packet will be sent without modification 
int p = atoi((char*) gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(port))); 
//porrt is 16 bit number so two unsigned char for 8 older bits and 
and 8 younger bits must be compared to desired port 
if ((dane[22]==(p>>8))&&(dane[23]==(p&255))&& (ret>60)) 
{ 
  
if (trigger==0) 
{ 
  
if (message[punteromessage]==1) 
    { 
      
        dane[ret-26]=0x0d; 
        dane[ret-25]=0x0a; 
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    ret=ret-24; 
    dane[3]=ret; 
    } 
  
punteromessage=punteromessage+1; 
length=length-1; 
if (length==0) 
    { 
    length=sizeof(message)/sizeof(message[0]); 
    punteromessage=0; 
     //system("iptables -D OUTPUT -p TCP -j QUEUE"); 
    }    
              
            //IP checksum 
            u16 ip_header[10]; 
              
            dane[10] = 0x00; 
            dane[11] = 0x00; 
              
            for(int i=0; i<10; i++) 
            { 
                ip_header[i] = unsignedShortToInt(dane+2*i); 
            } 
              
            u16 ip_header_sum = csum(ip_header,10); 
            u16 ip_header_sum_begin = ip_header_sum; 
            ip_header_sum_begin >>= 8; 
            dane[10] = ip_header_sum_begin; 
            dane[11] = ip_header_sum; 
              
        //TCP checksum 
            u16 tcp_header[((ret-20)/2)+6]; 
              
            dane[36] = 0x00; 
            dane[37] = 0x00; 
  
        danetcp[0] = 0x00; 
        danetcp[1] = dane[9]; 
              
            for(int i=0; i<(ret-20)/2; i++) 
            { 
                tcp_header[i] = unsignedShortToInt(dane+20+2*i); 
            } 
  
            for(int i=0; i<4; i++) 
            { 
                tcp_header[i+(ret-20)/2] = 
unsignedShortToInt(dane+12+2*i); 
            } 
  
        tcp_header[((ret-20)/2)+4]= unsignedShortToInt(danetcp); 
  
        tcp_header[((ret-20)/2)+5]= ret-20; 
              
            u16 tcp_header_sum = csum(tcp_header,((ret-20)/2)+6); 
            u16 tcp_header_sum_begin = tcp_header_sum; 
            tcp_header_sum_begin >>= 8; 
            dane[36] = tcp_header_sum_begin; 
            dane[37] = tcp_header_sum; 
  
} 
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else if (trigger!=0) 
{ 
trigger=trigger-1; 
} 
      
gtk_text_buffer_insert(buffer, &iter, "Packet captured\n", -1); 
} 
  
       
    return nfq_set_verdict(qh, id, NF_ACCEPT, ret, dane); 
} 
  
• F8 method case, main function for modifying the packets, receiver side 
int message[4096]; 
int puntero=175; 
int punteromessage=0; 
int trigger=1; 
 
//MAIN FUNCTION FOR modyfying packets 
static int cb(struct nfq_q_handle *qh, struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg, 
              struct nfq_data *nfa, void *data) 
{ 
  
  
    u_int32_t id = print_pkt(nfa); 
    //printf("entering callback\n"); 
      
    char *data2; 
    int ret = nfq_get_payload(nfa, &data2); 
    if (ret >= 0) 
          
        for(int i=0; i<ret; i++) 
        { 
            dane[i] = (unsigned char)data2[i]; 
                  
    } 
       
//Checking if this is desired port p will be port number from 
window field. packet will be sent without modification 
int p = atoi((char*) gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(port))); 
//porrt is 16 bit number so two unsigned char for 8 older bits and 
and 8 younger bits must be compared to desired port 
if ((dane[22]==(p>>8))&&(dane[23]==(p&255))&& (ret>60)) 
{ 
  
if (trigger==0) 
{ 
if (ret==230) 
    { 
    message[punteromessage]=0; 
    std::cout<<message[punteromessage]; 
    punteromessage=punteromessage+1; 
    } 
  
else if (ret<230) 
    { 
    message[punteromessage]=1; 
    std::cout<<message[punteromessage]; 
    punteromessage=punteromessage+1; 
    for (int i=0;i<24;i++) 
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        { 
        dane[214+i]=header[i]; 
        } 
    ret=ret+24; 
    dane[3]=ret; 
    } 
              
            //IP checksum 
            u16 ip_header[10]; 
              
            dane[10] = 0x00; 
            dane[11] = 0x00; 
              
            for(int i=0; i<10; i++) 
            { 
                ip_header[i] = unsignedShortToInt(dane+2*i); 
            } 
              
            u16 ip_header_sum = csum(ip_header,10); 
            u16 ip_header_sum_begin = ip_header_sum; 
            ip_header_sum_begin >>= 8; 
            dane[10] = ip_header_sum_begin; 
            dane[11] = ip_header_sum; 
              
        //TCP checksum 
            u16 tcp_header[((ret-20)/2)+6]; 
              
            dane[36] = 0x00; 
            dane[37] = 0x00; 
  
        danetcp[0] = 0x00; 
        danetcp[1] = dane[9]; 
              
            for(int i=0; i<(ret-20)/2; i++) 
            { 
                tcp_header[i] = unsignedShortToInt(dane+20+2*i); 
            } 
  
            for(int i=0; i<4; i++) 
            { 
                tcp_header[i+(ret-20)/2] = 
unsignedShortToInt(dane+12+2*i); 
            } 
  
        tcp_header[((ret-20)/2)+4]= unsignedShortToInt(danetcp); 
  
        tcp_header[((ret-20)/2)+5]= ret-20; 
              
            u16 tcp_header_sum = csum(tcp_header,((ret-20)/2)+6); 
            u16 tcp_header_sum_begin = tcp_header_sum; 
            tcp_header_sum_begin >>= 8; 
            dane[36] = tcp_header_sum_begin; 
            dane[37] = tcp_header_sum; 
  
} 
  
else if (trigger!=0) 
{ 
std::cout<< "\nThe secret message received is: "; 
trigger=trigger-1; 
} 
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gtk_text_buffer_insert(buffer, &iter, "Packet captured\n", -1); 
} 
  
       
    return nfq_set_verdict(qh, id, NF_ACCEPT, ret, dane); 
} 
 
 
When combining F6, F7 and F8 Methods, we use the previously shown code combined. 
• Main Compilation command 
 
g++ -std=c++0x –o pogram_name program_name.cc –lnfnetlink –
lnetfilter_queue –lgthread-2.0 –w ‘pkg-config gtk+-2.0 --cflags --libs’ 
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